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SUMMARY
Recent literature on industrial districts and enterprise clusters suggests that the grouping of enterprises into
sectoral and geographic clusters gives rise to a certain collective efficiency that can enhance competitiveness and
foster industrialisation. This paper reports the results of an analysis of eight African enterprise clusters: three in
Kenya that were the subject of original research, and five others for which substantial secondary literature was
available. The study addresses three questions: First, do the clusters have the characteristics associated with
successful industrial districts elsewhere? Second, to what extent have they been able to respond to opportunities
and shocks in their environment? And third, how closely are these clusters linked to the wider industrialisation
process in their countries? The research found that only two of the eight clusters have the internal structure and
wider market access that generally go with successful industrial districts, but that even these two are at very
different levels of development. The rest of the clusters consist almost entirely of microenterprises selling in
localised markets. Nearly all of the clusters could be said to be in some way involved with their country's
industrialisation process, but the nature of that involvement varies with the level of development of the cluster.
The first group consists of small-enterprise clusters that lay the groundwork for industrialisation by developing
basic skills and fostering the transition from craft to factory production. The next group of clusters, which has
clearer signs of collective efficiency, is characterised by greater specialisation and differentiation of firms,
bilateral production linkages, and somewhat higher technologies. The final group consists of clusters with large
as well as small firms that aim at wider markets and are generally able to produce competitively. The paper
draws implications from the findings about the appropriate support for clusters at each stage, and makes
suggestions for further research.
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31   INTRODUCTION 1
The place is alive with activity and the sound of hammers on metal. This is Kamukunji, one of Nairobi's best
known jua kali sites.2 Hundreds of artisans and their trainees are fabricating metal products – brightly painted
boxes, wheelbarrows, charcoal stoves, cooking pots and utensils, and many more – for sale to wholesalers and
direct to consumers. The place is hot and dusty, with few amenities. Most of the artisans still work without
shelter, despite the addition over 10 years ago of a few large roofed sheds. Less than a kilometre away is
Nairobi's industrial area, home to companies with names like Metal Equipment, Zenith Steel, New World
Industries. Although the roads are breaking down and the power supply is erratic at best, the factories of the
industrial area immediately convey the impression that industrialisation is happening in Kenya. But is
industrialisation confined to the factories? Or is Kamukunji somehow part of the process?
This paper explores the link between clusters of enterprises, many of them not unlike Kamukunji and the
industrialisation process in Africa. More specifically, the aim is to examine the ability of clusters to make a
positive contribution to developing Africa's capacity for industrial activity. Original research has been carried
out on two sets of enterprise clusters in Kenya: one of motor vehicle repair enterprises in Nairobi and Thika,
and another of fish processing in the Lake Victoria region. As background for those studies, a review of
secondary sources of information on clusters in Africa was conducted. The information was difficult to obtain
because, like much African scholarship, it is more often contained in conference papers and consultancy reports,
than in published books or articles. An initial attempt to gather materials by faxing requests to relevant
departments in African universities failed miserably. What is reported, therefore, is the result of  mining my own
academic network. Not surprisingly, most of the studies reported are from English-speaking countries, and a
disproportionate share of the references come from Kenya. The coverage of clusters is not exhaustive, nor do
the studies of clusters reported use similar methodologies or pursue the same questions. My selection was based
on two criteria: first, the existence of a single study or group of studies describing the cluster that provided
information on the key variables in the analysis; and second, a pre-screening that attempted to identify clusters
with actual or potential links to the industrialisation process. Hopefully, as this paper is shared and discussed
across the continent, additional materials will surface, enabling us to correct the errors and misconceptions that
may have arisen from the imbalance of case study representation.
The original research focused on two questions: First, do the African clusters have the characteristics
associated with successful industrial districts elsewhere? And second, to what extent have they been able to
respond to opportunities and shocks in their environment? To the extent possible from the available material,
the paper has addressed the same questions in the review of the case study material. The analysis attempts to go
beyond simple answers to these questions to explore a third question: how closely are these clusters linked the
the wider industrialisation process in their countries?
The paper is organised into six parts. Following this introduction is the theoretical discussion of the
relationship of enterprise clusters to industrialisation. Then Part 3 examines three clusters that, although at a
very basic level of development, appear to be laying the groundwork for future industrialisation. Part 4 analyses
three other clusters that show unmistakable signs of actual industrialisation, and Part 5 examines two clusters
4that have some of the internal diversity and ability to reach wider product markets typical of industrial districts.
The final section draws conclusions from the analysis.
2   ENTERPRISE CLUSTERS IN THE INDUSTRIALISATION PROCESS
Before attempting to establish the theoretical links between clustering and industrialisation, it is useful to
delineate more precisely the meaning of an enterprise cluster.
2.1   Enterprise Clusters
The term cluster is used in two somewhat different ways in the industrial development literature. Porter (1990)
uses the term to designate a group of firms engaged in similar or related activities within a national economy.
Although Porter (1990: 761) believes that the relationships within an industry cluster benefit from firms being
located near one another, he does not consider geographic proximity to be a defining characteristic of clusters.
The second use of the term is explicitly geographic. According to Schmitz (1992), a cluster is characterised
by a geographic and sectoral agglomeration of enterprises. This approach has its roots in Marshall's (1890)
analysis on the textile and metalworking districts of England, Germany, and France during the latter half of the
nineteenth century.  It has recently been elaborated in studies of highly successful industrial districts in various
parts of the world (see, for example, Piore and Sabel 1984; Zeitlin 1989; Storper and Walker 1989; Becattini
1989; Sengenberger and Pyke 1992; Humphrey 1995).3
This study adopts the second definition, because geographic proximity appears to be particularly important
in developing countries where poor infrastructure, weak information systems, and cultures that place high value
on face-to-face communication are the norm.
The discussion of developing country enterprise clusters tends to focus on how closely they resemble
successful industrial districts elsewhere. This is a useful and perhaps necessary exercise, but not the end-point of
cluster analysis. The many clusters that fail to measure up as industrial districts are not a homogeneous group,
and the differences among them may well provide important insights into their potential as means of
industrialisation.
Clusters can also be understood by examining their different patterns of specialisation and cooperation.
Pedersen (1997: 23–24), from a preliminary analysis of African clusters, identifies four general types: (1) the
diversified industrial cluster; (2) the subcontractor cluster; (3) the market town or distribution centre; and (4) the
specialised petty commodity cluster, with enterprises specialised horizontally. The breakdown has obvious roots
in the African reality and, as Pedersen's (1997: 27) conclusions show, is useful in tailoring policy to a particular
setting. The typology is less helpful in furthering the analysis of cluster dynamics or in identifying the
contribution of clusters to the industrialisation process.
2.2   Clusters and the Industrialisation Process
Industrialisation, like the broader process of development of which it is a part, generally involves increasing
complexity of production which, in turn, demands greater reliance on others for certain activities (Mead 1994).
5Enterprise clustering can affect industrialisation by making it easier for this process of specialisation and
differentiation to take place.
When firms undertake related activities in close geographic proximity, both the immediate environment
and the firms themselves are likely to change. The environment begins to adapt to the presence of the firms by
attracting customers, traders, workers with related skills, individuals and firms wanting to offer services, and still
more enterprises anxious to benefit from the markets being created. Old institutions change and new ones
spring up. Some developments happen spontaneously; others occur only when the firms in the cluster take
collective action. For example, traders may simply appear because they heard of the existence of the cluster, but
government may have to be persuaded to improve infrastructure.
As the environment changes, so do the firms. At its most basic level, clustering seems to encourage
information sharing and opportunities for learning new techniques and designs. Sometimes firms then modify
their own operations. One firm may specialise in some aspect of the production process while another turns
from production to trade in inputs or final products. Still another firm may develop links with traders who visit
the cluster.
In short, clustering appears to have the potential to enable African countries to overcome or ease some of
the barriers to industrial development. By increasing market access, fostering communication and information
sharing, facilitating technological upgrading, increasing efficiency, and contributing to the development of
supportive institutions, clusters can build industrial capacity. In this way, clustering can provide gains not easily
available to dispersed enterprises.  These gains have been termed collective efficiency, defined as the
competitive advantage derived from local external economies and joint action (Schmitz 1995).
Schmitz (1995) highlights the two dimensions of collective efficiency: the planned and the unplanned, or in
Nadvi's (1996) terms, the active and the passive. External economies are rooted in the fact that the benefits of
economic action tend to spill over to other actors. The external effect is an unintended by-product of some
other activity (Mishan 1971). Schmitz (1997: 8) further argues that responding to opportunities and crises
requires shifting gears from the passive aspects of collective efficiency (external economies) to active collective
efficiency (Schmitz 1997: 8).  Before discussing these in greater detail, however, it is useful first to consider
some aspects of the environment in which clusters are situated.
2.3   Economic Context for Clustering
Each cluster operates in a particular economic context. This context, which is known to be critical to the
performance of individual firms, should be similarly important to the growth and development of enterprise
clusters. Three elements, borrowed from the industrial organisation literature (see, for example, Scherer 1980)
and institutional economics (see Williamson 1985, North 1990, Langlois and Robertson 1995) seem pertinent:
the nature and size of the product market, available economies of scale and scope, and the institutions
governing exchange relations.
62.3.1   Nature and size of product market
A cluster might be well-endowed and operating efficiently, but without a market for its products, it will die.
Markets have always been in the background of the discussions of clusters and flexible specialisation, but they
have not always received the explicit analysis they need and deserve. A full treatment of the subject would
require another paper, so this discussion will focus on two aspects only: the nature of the product and the sticky
issue of market size.
The nature of a cluster's products obviously has an impact on they way they are marketed. Some products
of small enterprise are inferior goods for which demand can be expected to fall as consumer incomes rise.
Stoves and cooking utensils made of scrap metal, and rubber tyre sandals are two good examples of this type of
product. Consumer, intermediate, and capital goods have different markets and require different marketing
strategies. Perishability influences marketing channels. Many food products require special handling, even after
processing, and must be brought to market much more quickly than, say, furniture or clothing. The relationship
between the production process and the acceptability of the final product is another consideration. Some
products can be made equally well by craft or factory methods, but others, especially traditional handicrafts, lose
a significant portion of their market when they are machine made. The list of considerations could be extended
almost indefinitely. The point to be emphasised is that the nature of a cluster's products has a direct bearing on
whether a cluster is likely to industrialise and, if it can, how the industrialisation process needs to proceed.
Market size, both the number of participants and their geographic spread, is also critical to cluster
development and the larger process of industrialisation of which it is a part. Schmitz (1997: 11–12) underscores
this point when he states that 'clustering can give rise to successive layers of specialisation provided that the
overall scale of demand grows' (emphasis in original). The simplest conceptualisation of market size is that it is
defined by the size of the local population and the level of their purchasing power. By this measure, markets in
Africa are small and access to foreign markets difficult. Small national populations, low incomes, poor
infrastructure, and movement restrictions left over from colonial times are among the reasons for small
domestic markets. Weak distribution systems help to keep markets small and segmented in many African
countries  (Pedersen 1997). The lack of a large well-functioning wholesale trade system, or where such systems
exist, their bias towards the products of large industry forces many small producers to sell their products retail
or carry them to distant markets themselves.
The problem of small domestic markets is one that has to be faced squarely by individual enterprises and
enterprise clusters, but it is not insurmountable. Two broad strategies are available: firms can extend their
market geographically, or they can attempt to capitalise on the smallness of the markets they face. The first
option may involve expanding within the domestic market or entering foreign markets. The choice will depend
on a number of factors, including the nature of the product; but generally speaking, broadening domestic
market coverage is easier for most small-firm clusters than exporting.
Barriers to entry into foreign markets include problems with the products themselves (poor quality, poor
packaging, etc.), and environmental factors such as poor infrastructure for exporting (especially problematic for
perishable goods), lack of information flow, and red tape and corruption. Despite these difficulties, African
industry can be competitive in some areas. The Regional Programme for Economic Development identified
7export opportunities for garments and home products in both the US and European markets (Biggs et al. 1994,
1996). One of the case studies reported in this paper documents the export challenges and opportunities faced
by the Kenyan fish processing industry.
Efficient small firms have another option open to them. They can attempt to capitalise on the small
domestic market. Dawson (1992: 35, 37) argues that the small size of most domestic markets in Africa can
actually be a boon to small enterprises. Where markets are small and relatively specialised, producers who can
manufacture small batches efficiently can out-compete large firms.
2.3.2   Available economies of scale and scope
The size of output is clearly related to market size. The entrepreneur who can reach a larger market can produce
more, and can often gain more than proportionately from the increased output. This is the result of what
economists call 'increasing returns'. The most familiar form of increasing return arises from scale economies,
but at least as important, especially in situations where the market for any given product is likely to be small, are
economies of scope.
Increasing returns arise when an increase in all inputs leads to a more-than-proportional increase in output.
Even when a firm is able to produce more efficiently at higher levels, scale economies may not actually be
available. Available economies of scale are related not only to market size, but also to investment in machinery
and the opportunities for division of labour in production. At the level of production and investment, it appears
that scale economies could be available to African enterprise in many subsectors. African firms typically operate
at suboptimal size, even compared with those in other developing countries (see Table 2.1). Although some of
the differences in average plant size between industrialised and developing countries may be due to factors such
as the use of different technologies, many African firms, including those in most of the clusters discussed
below, appear to operate at an uneconomically small scale (Pryor 1972, Cortes et al. 1987: 21–27).
Table 2.1 :    Average plant s izes,  selected industr ies
High-income countries Middle and low-income countries
Industry N Average size
(no. of workers)
N Average size
(no. of workers)
Fabricated metal 9 38.3   9 15.4
Apparel 9 43.0 14 13.4
Furniture 7 55.4 13   4.4
Source: Cortes et al. 1987: 222–23
Although the general distinction between craft and factory production is useful to bear in mind, it is also
important to recognise that in practice the two can be mixed. Sverrisson (1992: 105) speaks of mechanisation
being inserted bit by bit into the prevailing craft mode of production. First one process is mechanised, then
another. At any given moment,  the use of specialised machines is likely to be combined with the continuance of
unspecialised labour. The result is a production process in which each artisan works on his own piece, using
8whatever machinery is available, but without collaboration with other workers, from the beginning until the item
is finished. One of the major challenges faced by entrepreneurs as their firms grow is changing from craft to
factory production methods. Clusters can ease this shift in the productive process by permitting the division of
labour to occur on a firm-by-firm basis, rather than within a single enterprise.
Economies of scope are present when it is more efficient to operate two or more activities in tandem than
in isolation (Coase 1937; Storper and Walker 1989: 130–31). Several types of economies of scope are available
to small enterprises and, by extension, to enterprise clusters. The most common may be situations of
concurrent scale economies, where the processes involved in producing two or more products reach their
least cost output at roughly the same level. Thus the producer of cooking pots may diversify into related metal
products and achieve economies of scope, even when the size of the market for any one of these products may
not allow scale economies to be realised. Coordinative scale economies are available when integration of
labour processes and regulation of material flows benefit overall production efficiency. A good example is the
food processor who varies her products according to the growing seasons in order to keep her machinery
operating fully throughout the year. Another, which emerges in one of the South African case studies, is the
savings realised from marketing a line of products jointly.  Economies of scope are also available from the
sharing of technical know-how and working skills from one process or product to another. The furniture
makers who expand into making wooden crates and construction goods are an example of this type of economy
of scope.
2.3.3   Institutions governing exchange relations
That institutions are important to development in general and industrialisation in particular is now generally
accepted. A full treatment of the economic and social institutions governing the exchange of goods and services
would take us far beyond the boundaries of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention to two
inter-related issues that arise in several of the cases that follow.
The first is trust. Economic exchange will not normally take place without a certain measure of trust
between the parties. Trust involves shared expectations of the outcome of a transaction.  Humphrey and
Schmitz (1996) define trust in terms of agents' belief that the other party, given the chance to act
opportunistically, will not do so. Zucker (1986) distinguishes three different bases for trust: (1) process-based,
where trust is tied to past or expected exchange, such as in reputation or gift-exchange; (2) characteristic-based,
where trust is tied to the personal characteristics of the other party; and (3) institutionally-based, where trust is
tied to institutional certification or enforcement. The first two types, according to Zucker, need to be replaced
by institutionally-based trust when societies become larger, more socially heterogeneous, and more
geographically dispersed.
The second issue, clearly related to the first, is contract enforcement. Much institutionally-based trust
depends on the existence of a third party, prepared and able to enforce contracts and prevent opportunistic
behaviour (Zucker 1986, North 1990). In Africa, however, such institutions often are either missing or seem
unable to function.  Survey results from Ghana suggest that enforcement of commercial contracts is
problematic for two reasons (Fafchamps 1996). First, there is no mechanism by which information about
9defaulters is widely shared among firms, and second, the risks and uncertainties under which firms operate
cause many of them to default on contracts at least occasionally. Firms have little faith in the legal system as a
means of ensuring that customers or suppliers fulfill their contracts or compensate them for breach of contract.
Kimuyu (1997) found that one-third or less of Kenyan manufacturers would take a supplier or customer to
court, and that the proportion of micro and small enterprises using the courts to settle disputes is even smaller.
Firms tend to insist that customers pay cash, granting credit only to the most trustworthy. They protect
themselves against problems with suppliers by inspecting goods before making payment, instead of taking them
on faith and negotiating afterwards if quality is deficient.
2.4   External Economies
Passive collective efficiency is essentially reaping the benefits of external economies. External economies exist
when social benefits are higher than private benefits. External economies are the unintended or incidental by-
products of economic action. Krugman (1991), following Marshall (1890), identifies three main types of external
economies in enterprise clusters: labour-market pooling, development of specialised local suppliers and services,
and technological spillovers. To these must be added the most basic of agglomeration economies: market
access.
Market access is the first and, as we will see, most universal external economy for clustered firms. The
grouping of producers in close geographic proximity facilitates the meeting of buyers and sellers. By attracting
buyers both from the immediate vicinity and more distant places, it improves access to the overall market for a
firm's products or services. Thus, once a cluster is established, market access is one of the potential benefits of
locating within its bounds.
Sectoral and geographical concentration of productive activities tends to create a pool of specialised skills
that benefits both workers and firms. Such pools of industry-specific skills are evident in many developing
country clusters (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 41). Whether they are also present in African clusters is a matter for
investigation.
Clustering of firms also gives rise to specialised suppliers of inputs and services.  The concentration of
producer firms with similar supply needs attracts suppliers offering raw materials or components, new or
second-hand machinery, and spare parts (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 13–14).  Clustering seems to ease supply
constraints, often found to hold back small-scale industry in Africa.
Finally, clustering facilitates the diffusion of technological know-how and ideas. It does this by permitting
the rapid flow of technical information between producers operating near one another, and also by enhancing
information flow between traders, producers, suppliers, and others connected to the cluster (Nadvi and Schmitz
1994: 18). Given that one of the major characteristics of developing countries is their weak technological base,
technological spillovers within a cluster could well be particularly important.
There is, however, a downside of external economies. According to mainstream economics, the lack of
match between social and private returns represents a market failure that affects investment. Specifically,
external economies can lead to under-investment because of the lack of adequate reward for that investment. If
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this is true, then these disabling external economies may be a factor in the failure to grow of many African
clusters.
2.5   Joint Action
Schmitz (1997) contends that local external economies are necessary for the development of a strong cluster,
but that they are not sufficient. What he terms 'consciously pursued joint action' must also be present for
industrial clusters to flourish.
Figure 2.1 :    Forms of joint action in clusters
Dimension Bilateral Multilateral
Horizontal Two cooperators at the same level in
the production chain, e.g. sharing
equipment
More than two cooperators at the
same level in the production chain, e.g.
a sectoral association
Vertical Two cooperators at different levels of
the production chain, e.g. a producer
and user improving components
More than two cooperators at
different levels of the production
chain, e.g. an association or alliance
composed of manufacturers and
distributors of a product
Source:  Adapted from Schmitz (1997)
This emphasis on the 'joint action' aspects of collective efficiency underscores the importance of inter-firm
linkages and networks.4 One can identify four categories of joint action in clusters, based on two dimensions.
The first dimension has to do with the number of cooperators; the second, with the direction of cooperation.5
Thus joint action may be bilateral or multilateral. In bilateral cooperation, two firms work together as, for
example, when they share an expensive piece of equipment. In multilateral action, groups of firms join together,
often in an association or other organisation, for some common purpose. Joint action may also be vertical or
horizontal. Vertical cooperation happens when firms involved in different stages of the production–distribution
chain work together. Horizontal joint action refers to collaboration between/among competitors. The four types
of joint action can be viewed schematically in Figure 2.1.
Active cultivation of such firm linkages and entrepreneurial networks apparently contributes to the growth
of enterprises (Barr 1995, Alila and McCormick 1997). Whether the active aspects of collective efficiency are a
necessary ingredient for cluster success remains to be seen. It is also important to recognise that joint action has
its costs. The opportunity costs of associational activity are probably the most obvious example. When
businesses are very small, and joint action must be undertaken by the entrepreneur, he/she must carefully weigh
the use of scarce time for attendance at meetings or other activities that do not bring immediate benefit. Joint
action may also have political costs, especially in situations where the authorities frown upon grassroots
initiatives.
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2.6   Clusters and Industrialisation: An Analytical Framework
The discussion thus far suggests that clustering has the potential to facilitate the industrialisation both within the
cluster and beyond it, but that such potential is not always realised.  We know that many clusters get stuck at
low levels of production and distribution. A clearer understanding not only of clusters that have industrialised,
but also of those that remain essentially small-enterprise agglomerations should provide insights  into steps that
business associations, governments, and other interested parties might take to further the process of Africa's
industrialisation.
Preliminary analysis suggests that African clusters fall broadly into three groups (McCormick 1998). The
first group makes its contribution by building a productive environment that, in some respects at least, prepares
the ground for industrialisation. The second group of clusters already has much clearer signs of emerging
collective efficiency. These clusters are already industrialising, but remain limited by the weak technology of
most of the firms and the frequent sidetracking of associational activity.  The third group of clusters includes
large as well as small and medium-size firms. They aim for wider markets, national and/or foreign, and are
generally able to produce competitively. These clusters fall squarely within the industrialisation process, though
serious challenges remain.
Within each group, we examine each cluster's economic context and its internal operations.  The contextual
variables are three: the nature and size of the product market, the actual or potential economies of scale and
scope, and the institutions governing exchange. Within the cluster, the analysis considers both external
economies and joint action. A brief treatment of the general history and specific turning-points of each cluster
provides both additional contextual material and a sense of cluster dynamics.
Saying that existing clusters are at different levels of development does not imply a 'stages of growth'
model of development (see Rostow 1960). For one thing, as will be clear from the histories of the clusters
described in this paper, the origins and growth paths of clusters vary greatly. By no means do all begin at the
first level, nor do they proceed through a uniform set of stages. The levels described above are rough guides to
the relative development of this particular set of clusters. They are useful because they help to explain clusters'
differing needs, and perhaps more importantly, they demonstrate the multiformity of the links between
enterprise clusters and the industrialisation process.
3   LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR INDUSTRIALISATION
The successful Latin American and Asian clusters look very different from the African cluster studied to date.
The footwear cluster in the Sinos valley of Brazil boasted more than 1,800 firms with an average employment of
over 80 persons each in 1991, causing  Schmitz (1993) to name it a 'supercluster'. The firms included shoe
manufacturers, subcontractors producing parts of shoes, producers of inputs, export and forwarding agents, and
other related activities. Exports of shoes produced in the Sinos valley were valued at nearly US$1.2 billion in
1991. Another cluster, in Sialkot, Pakistan, produces stainless steel medical, dental and surgical instruments for
markets in North America and Western Europe (Nadvi 1997). The Sialkot cluster consists of 300–350
manufacturing firms, up to 1,500 task-specific subcontracting units, and a variety of suppliers and service
providers. Sialkot firms average approximately 20 workers each. The cluster supplies roughly half the global
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market for disposable 'floor' instruments, and around 10–15 per cent of world production of high quality
'operation theatre' instruments.
In contrast, most African clusters are hardly more than basic sectoral agglomerations consisting of
hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of tiny firms, that operate at much lower levels of technology. They have
few linkages within or outside the cluster, and their capacity for joint action is weak. This section examines three
small-enterprise clusters, all in Kenya, all at a low level of development. The subsequent two sections focus on
more advanced clusters in several African countries.  All three sections address the questions posed in the
introduction: do the clusters have the characteristics associated with successful industrial districts elsewhere? To
what extent have they been able to respond to opportunities and shocks in their environment? And, how closely
are these clusters linked to the wider industrialisation process in their countries?
3.1   Garment Production, Nairobi
Nairobi has two large garment-making clusters, housed in city council markets on the eastern side of the city.
Most of the firms in the two markets are 'mini-manufacturers', i.e. small firms with limited division of labour
(McCormick et al. 1997).  In addition to approximately 600 producers, the markets support traders in inputs and
finished products, machine repairers, scissors sharpeners, transporters, and food kiosks. Although there are no
formal financial institutions within the clusters, several NGOs offer credit to businesses in the markets.
3.1.1   History and turning-points of the Nairobi garment markets
Uhuru and Quarry Road markets were built in 1974 to replace older makeshift premises dating from colonial
times. Quarry Road market, consisting of three concrete-block buildings, is in Gikomba, about two kilometres
east of Nairobi's city centre. Uhuru market, a similar, but larger complex of five buildings, is a few kilometres to
the south.
Two clear turning-points can be identified. In the late 1970s businesses turned from retailing second-hand
clothes to making new clothing (McCormick et al. 1994). The products sold well, both in Nairobi and secondary
towns. The 1984 ban on imports of second-hand clothes strengthened their position. The cluster's second
turning-point came when this ban was lifted in 1991 (Ongile and McCormick 1996).  At that point the
combination of increased competition and already slack demand caused by a depressed economy was a real
blow to small-scale production.
In 1989 Uhuru market housed 361 garment manufacturers, and Gikomba market, 235 (McCormick 1997).
The premises, though clearly better than the outdoor sites of the jua kali metalworkers and carpenters, are
unsuitable for garment manufacturing. Lighting is poor, electricity supply erratic, and business services lacking.
The semi-open stalls are too cramped to allow for efficient flow of work and lack the privacy needed for new
product development (McCormick et al. 1997).
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3.1.2   Economic context for the clothing production
Kenyan garment producers face complex markets.  A few large-scale producers have managed to break into the export
market (McCormick 1992, Biggs et al. 1994, 1996). Domestic markets can be roughly divided into the markets for
general men's, women's, and children's wear and specialised markets such as those for uniforms, overalls, wedding
dresses, etc. Each market segment can be further divided according to product price and quality.
The domestic market for new clothes is constrained by the poverty and declining purchasing power of
most Kenyans, the local nature of distribution systems, and the availability of cheap alternatives. Average real
wages declined by 57% in the private sector and 49% in the public sector between 1988 and 1994 (Kenya,
1995c and 1992a). Unlike Zimbabwe and South Africa, Kenya does not have a national clothing distribution
system (Pedersen 1993, October 1996). Large chains of clothing retailers do not exist, and except in Nairobi and
a few large towns, even small retail shops are few. This means that producers must either sell to traders who
travel to specific 'up-country' locations, or go themselves to sell their wares. Naturally, this limits the size of the
market that garment manufacturers can access. The market is further limited by the availability of cheap
alternatives to new clothing. For poor consumers and, increasingly for those in the middle-income range,
second-hand clothes compete with new ones for the family clothing budget (Ongile and McCormick 1996).
Economies of scale and scope are theoretically available, but may be difficult for these producers to realise.
The mini-manufacturers averaged only 3.5 workers per firm compared with a developing country average of
13.4 workers in apparel firms (see Table 2.1 above). Their total factor productivity (TFP) was also lower than
any other group of garment producers in Nairobi. Both of these facts indicate ample room for realising scale
economies. Studies elsewhere suggest that economies of scope may also be available in clothing production
(October 1996, Visser 1996).
3.1.3   External economies in the garment markets
The main external economies for these firms are market access and, to a lesser degree, the availability of
intermediate inputs and services. Neither labour-market pooling nor technological spillovers appear to support
cluster activity.
Market access is a major benefit to location in these clusters. The garment markets have become known in
Nairobi as places where inexpensive clothing can be bought at either retail or wholesale prices. Particularly
important, though not fully described, is the markets' ability to attract traders who will carry clothing to the
smaller towns and rural areas (McCormick 1997).
The clusters have given rise to limited trade in intermediate inputs and have also spawned some basic
services. 6 Gikomba has three fabric sellers and six shops selling buttons, thread, and other materials. Uhuru has
ten fabric retailers in the open-air market outside the main market, but clothing producers claim that prices are
so high that they are forced to go to wholesale and retail shops in the centre of Nairobi. There are also mobile
traders who bring cloth, scissors, buttons, and other items to the markets. Each market has several machine
repairers, scissors sharpeners, and food kiosks to cater for the needs of the workers. Outside of each are
transporters with pickup trucks and handcarts ready to be hired to take products to market or transport inputs
from town.
Table 3.1 :    Comparison of Enterprise Clusters
Cluster Producing Firms Average Firm Size Products Markets External Economies Joint Action
Garment markets 600 3.5 Clothing Domestic: mainly rural
and secondary towns
Improved market access
Some labour market pooling
Weak intermediate input effects
Weak bilateral linkages
No multilateral linkages
Kamukunji 2,000 1–2 Metal products Domestic: consumers,
traders, and firms
Improved market access
Disabling labour market pooling
Weak intermediate input effects
Little technological spillover
Few bilateral linkages
Association focused mainly on
supply-side constraints
Thika 337 1.6 Vehicle repair Thika individuals,
especially matatu and truck
owners
Improved market access
Positive, but weak, intermediate
input effects
Disabling labour market pooling
Disabling technology spillovers
Extensive subcontracting
Site association focused on supply-
side constraints
Suame metal 3–4,000 5–6 Metal products Domestic: consumers and
firms
Passive exports
Improved market access
Positive labour market pooling
Limited intermediate input effects
Limited, but important,
technological spillover
Only engineering workshops have
positive bilateral linkages
Site association representing diverse
interests
Suame vehicle repair 4–5,000 6.5 Vehicle repair Domestic: consumers and
firms
Passive exports
Improved market access
Disabling labour market pooling
Positive intermediate input effects
Recipient of technological
spillovers
Extensive subcontracting
Some (important) vertical links with
engineering workshops
Garages Association mainly an
intermediary between firms and
government
Ziwani 506 1.5 Vehicle repair Nairobi individuals,
especially matatu and truck
owners firms
Improved market access
Weak intermediate input effects
Weak technological spillovers
Extensive subcontracting
Association dealing with both
supply and market constraints
Western Cape 538 126 Clothing Large retail chains
Domestic: 'fashion' and
standard; also some to
export market
Market access
Positive labour market pooling
Significant intermediate input
effects
Potential for significant
technological spillovers
Vertical and horizontal bilateral
cooperation
Horizontal multilateral cooperation
(2 associations)
Vertical multilateral cooperation
(common trading agents)
Uhanya Beach plus
industrial processors
560 Fishing: 3–15
Trading: 1–50
Industrial processors:
35–300
Fresh and processed
fish
Mainly export
Limited domestic
Market access Strong vertical bilateral action
No effective horizontal linkages
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Economies associated with labour-market pooling and technology spillovers appear to be minimal. Labour
is there, but entrepreneurs – especially those involved in slightly larger enterprises – say that the skill levels are
uneven (McCormick et al. 1997). The technology used is very basic, so there is little improved technology to spill
over!
3.1.4   Joint action among garment producers
Firm linkages within the clusters appear to be weak. Despite the large concentrations of garment businesses,
effective horizontal linkages are lacking. Some vertical linkages on both the input and supply sides exist, but it is
not clear whether these ties lead to beneficial joint action.
Horizontal bilateral linkages are confined mainly to borrowing and lending of basic tools, such as scissors
and measuring tapes, and the contracting of services requiring specialised machines (McCormick 1997: 117).
One reason for the weak linkages appears to be lack of trust. For example, entrepreneurs interviewed
complained that, as soon as they develop a new design, their competitors steal it.
Horizontal multilateral linkages do not exist. Neither market has a site association, and there is no sectoral
association of garment producers anywhere in Nairobi. A group of medium-sized producers said they were
interested in forming an association, and researchers encouraged them by calling two meetings, but the idea was
not carried forward (McCormick et al. 1997).
Vertical linkages with suppliers and garment traders exist, but information on the content of those linkages
is scanty. Most firms buy cloth from wholesalers located in Nairobi's city centre. Some have established enough
of a relationship with these wholesalers to qualify for credit (McCormick et al. 1997). Although location in these
markets offers access to the traders who frequent the buildings to buy finished goods, it is not clear whether
such traders offer the producers anything beyond a simple market transaction.
3.1.5   Nairobi garment producers: summary and conclusions
Although firms in these clusters use a simple division of labour that puts them squarely into factory production,
they have real difficulties in achieving economies of scale. On the one hand, they face problems of market size
caused by a weak distribution system, and on the other, they are constrained by problems of space and capital.
Both make it difficult for them to reduce units costs.
Market access and limited intermediate input effects are positive externalities in the cluster, but they are not
accompanied by effective joint action. They have no vehicle for negotiating with the Nairobi City Council,
which owns their business premises, for improvements in basic amenities. Nor do they have obvious links to
larger firms that might help in upgrading product quality or in connecting them to larger domestic or export
markets.
3.2   Metalwork in Kamukunji, Nairobi
Kamukunji is a large, busy cluster of tinsmiths, where nearly two thousand artisans fashion a variety of metal
products, including tin trunks, charcoal stoves, security bolts, cooking pots, griddles, bicycle carriers, and
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wheelbarrows  (Frijns et al. 1997; King 1996: 55–57; Undugu Design Unit 1995; Haan 1995; McCormick 1988).
The cluster's location between the industrial area and the country bus station make it accessible to both supply
and product markets.
Most firms use craft-based production methods and very simple technology  (Frijns et al. 1997). Fewer than
10% have the electricity connections that are essential to higher technology production. The majority use hand
tools or simple hand-operated machines to make products of new and/or used sheet metal. Production
processes are slow and products poor in quality. Workshops with electricity undertake welding, engineering, and
fabrication work,  frequently making to order rather than for the market. Their products include door and
window grills, metal brackets, hinges, door bolts and latches, bicycle parts and simple machines.
3.2.1   History and turning-points of the Kamukunji Jua Kali
Artisans working in Grogan, an area close to Nairobi's city centre, were displaced to make way for a housing
estate in 1978.7 Most of the vehicle repairers moved to Ziwani (see Kinyanjui 1997) while other types of
businesses relocated to Eastleigh and city council land at Kamukunji. Still others came to the Kamukunji site
from nearby Burma market.8 The local metalworkers were joined by others who migrated to the area from other
parts of the country to set up their businesses on the open land. In 1985 the council gave them 24 hours to
vacate the area, but the district commissioner restrained the council and allocated the land to the artisans
temporarily. Later that same year, President Moi visited the artisans and announced that sheds would be built
and the land given to the artisans. The president also instructed the artisans to organise themselves into an
association so that the government could better assist them.
This was a turning-point, partly because the sheds provided at least a few businesses with much needed
shelter from the sun and rain, but more importantly because of the new legitimacy the presidential decree
afforded the entire open-air small-manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, this support, which was to be further
developed in policy documents, was not well translated into practice (Kenya 1986, 1988, 1992b, 1996; Macharia
1993; McCormick 1996; King 1996).
3.2.2   Economic context for jua kali  metalwork
Kamukunji caters for a large low-income consumer market in Nairobi and up-country towns, and also supplies
certain products, such as wheelbarrows and farm implements, to agriculture and industry. Although there has
been no systematic investigation of the distribution system for metal products of the type produced at
Kamukunji, it appears that clients are both wholesalers who will often buy similar products from several
producers, and individuals (Frijns et al. 1997). Most Kamukunji products are of low quality with few variations.
The demand for such items is slowly decreasing as consumers gain access to higher standard goods from
supermarkets and retail shops (Undugu Design Unit 1995). Thus, although the potential market continues to
grow with Kenya's increasing population, the size of the market currently served may be shrinking.
Kamukunji has the potential for realising scale economies. Fabricated metal workshops in middle- and
low-income countries average 15.4 workers (see Table 2.1), suggesting that the one- and two-person
establishments in Kamukunji are probably  economically inefficient. Realising economies of scale would,
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however, mean changing the organisation of production from its present craft form to one using some division
of labour. This would, in turn, require standardising parts to a degree that is difficult to achieve with hand tools.
Economies of scope, especially managerial economies and concurrent scale economies, should be available
to these businesses. Realising such economies of scope will also entail changing the prevailing form of
production.
Contract enforcement is problematic in Kenya for reasons similar to those identified by Fafchamps (1996)
for Ghana. Artisans will, therefore, generally prefer to deal with persons they already know rather than with
those who might not only default, but also disappear.
3.2.3   External economies in Kamukunji
The most positive external economy for Kamukunji's producers  is the cluster's effect on firms' access to
product markets. The concentration of metalworkers in Kamukunji is well known in Nairobi and beyond, so it
no doubt serves as a magnet for customers. The way the artisans display their wares suggests that they are
conscious of the marketing role of the cluster. The association is active in promoting members' attendance at
trade shows,  jua kali exhibitions, and provincial agricultural shows (Hart 1994: 4). The association also attempts
to offer assistance to members in locating new local marketing channels and is trying to establish a working
relationship with the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce so that the Chamber can assist with exports to
other African countries.
Both private businesses and the association have attempted, with varying degrees of success,  to bring
intermediate inputs to Kamukunji. Frijns et al. (1997: 98) report that there are three hardware shops operating in
Kamukunji that provide nails, wires, metal strips, and other metal products. The association tried a system of
consolidated purchasing of raw materials from the large companies (Hart 1994). They sold them to the artisans
with no mark-up, thus giving their members a significant cost break. The effort broke down, however, because
the middlemen who had been supplying the artisans complained to the big companies that their business was
being eroded. As a result it became more difficult for the association to make direct purchases from the
companies.  In mid-1994, when Hart's research was being carried out, the association was looking for other
alternatives for obtaining raw materials.
Technological spillovers are minimal and confined to a small group of more sophisticated producers. The
oldest artisans in Kamukunji were trained by their Asian predecessors in the 1940s and 1950s.9 Most appear to
use the same skills and techniques learned then, despite some efforts on the part of the  association, the Ministry
of Research, Technical Training, and Technology (MRTTT), and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers to
provide seminars and exposure visits to local industry (Hart 1994). In general, Kamukunji exhibits little
technological development. If anything, there seems to be a dampening effect of low-level technology that
reduces firms' ability to realise economies of scale.
One exception has been the development of wheelbarrow production.10 Wheelbarrow making started at
Kamukunji in 1984 when artisans copied a wheelbarrow that they purchased from a Nairobi shop, and then
modified the design to make it stronger and easier to produce. At present about 12 different workshops make
wheelbarrows at Kamukunji. All use the 1984 design  to produce the wheelbarrow in three different sizes. They
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purchase the main materials (iron sheet, pipe, flats) and weld the final product together. There is no job
specialisation among the wheelbarrow makers. Each group makes the product from beginning to end. The
workshops attempt to standardise parts for their own wheelbarrows, but there is no standardisation across
producers. Nor, apparently, has anyone tried to improve the design that is now 14 years old.
Labour-market pooling, in a situation of very low skill requirements, should result in low labour costs.
Most Kamukunji firms, however, have no employees so this potential benefit is not realised. Furthermore, the
training system, when combined with very low barriers to entry in metal fabrication (see McCormick 1988: 55),
appears to encourage the multiplication of tiny firms.
3.2.4   Joint action in Kamukunji
Joint action in Kamukunji emanates from three different sets of inter-firm linkages. At the broadest multilateral
level is the Kamukunji Association which, in theory at least, includes all artisans working in Kamukunji. Next
are informal groupings of firms making similar products. Finally there are the usual bilateral exchanges of tools
and equipment, and occasional subcontracting arrangements.
Associational activity among Nairobi's metalworkers has a long history. Artisans had an organisation that
was stopped by the colonial government during the 'Emergency' of the 1950s.11 After that, groupings were
informal until early 1986 when the first self-help groups were formed in response to the president's call. The
ministry (MRTTT) encouraged the formation of such jua kali associations throughout the country, and of their
grouping into national 'associations of associations'. This allowed the government to channel all assistance to
the artisans through the National Federation of Jua Kali and local associations (Kamukunji 1994; Macharia
1993: 24 ff). The umbrella association took an active role in policy dialogue, the allocation of plots to jua kali
producers, and organising the annual jua kali trade fair until it became embroiled in a political dispute that led to
its dissolution in 1994 (Haan 1995, Kinyanjui 1998).
The present  Kamukunji  Jua Kali Association was formed in 1993. The MRTTT at that time requested the
self-help group to become an association (Kamukunji 1994). By 1994, the association had approximately 850
members, considerably more than the maximum of 270 recorded by its predecessor self-help group (Hart 1994).
In addition to serving as a conduit for funds, and carrying out the supply and marketing activities described
above, the association aimed to improve artisans' working conditions and provide them with access to technical
training (Kamukunji 1994). The association also provided services such as security – very important given lack
of lockable buildings – and through its women's group recycled leftover scrap metal (King 1996; Frijns et al.
1997). However, it has not had notable success in upgrading Kamukunji's infrastructure or general working
environment, nor does it appear to have succeeded in improving technology.
The second type of multilateral inter-firm cooperation is the informal grouping of similar businesses. One
striking example, already mentioned, is the group of twelve firms engaged in manufacturing wheelbarrows.
These, according to our informant, are now joining together to market their product, targeting especially
supermarkets that have hardware departments. They have not yet, however, tackled the difficult issue of
standardisation of parts across the group members. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this group is unique, or
if similar informal groups exist in Kamukunji.
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3.2.5   Summary and conclusions on Kamukunji cluster
In sum, then, Kamukunji is a large petty commodity cluster which is realising only a few of the potential
benefits of clustering. The cluster is well known and therefore provides access to local and national markets.
Some suppliers are located within the cluster, though it is not clear whether these have migrated in or are the
result of specialisation among existing firms. There appear to be few technological spillovers. Even where they
exist, as in the case of the wheelbarrow producers, problems such as standardisation have yet to be tackled.
Economies of scale are not being realised as producers continue to operate at uneconomically small sizes.
Kamukunji has a large pool of labour available, but it appears that most start their own firms rather than join
existing enterprises. Vertical joint action is entirely missing. Horizontal joint action is present in varying degrees.
At its broadest is the Kamukunji Jua Kali Association. The association suffers from some of the problems of
groups initiated 'from above' (Haan 1995). It seems to have been more successful in achieving the aim
articulated by the Provincial Technical Training Officer (i.e., bringing the artisans together so they can be
reached by government initiatives) than in meeting its own objectives. In particular, the association has been
thwarted in its attempt to undertake joint buying of raw materials and has been able to do very little to uplift the
overall standard of the working environment at Kamukunji. The effort of the wheelbarrow producers to market
their products together is a promising example of horizontal joint action on a smaller scale.
3.3   Vehicle repair in the Thika (Kenya) Jua Kali
The jua kali cluster in the Kigandaini ward of Thika, a town of approximately 72,000 people, 46 kilometres
northeast of Nairobi, houses over 300 enterprises involved in a variety of activities. Research carried out in
1996–97 investigated motor vehicle repair and related manufacturing and trading activities in the cluster
(McCormick et al. 1996; Kinyanjui 1996, 1997, 1998, McCormick 1998). About one-third (36%) of the
enterprises actually repair vehicles, an additional 8% sell spare parts, and 5% are involved in the manufacture of
spares. The remaining enterprises manufacture furniture, various metal products, stove and lantern wicks, mops,
cushions, mattresses, or are involved in the retailing of scrap metal and food.
All types of vehicles are repaired in Thika, but matatus and heavy commercial vehicles appear to
dominate.12 Only half (50%) of the repair firms say they repair private saloon cars. The vehicles are most
commonly between four and ten years old, though many firms said that they often repair vehicles in the 11–15
year age range. Newer vehicles are more likely to be taken to the larger garages (Kinyanjui 1998). For some, this
is because they are under warranty or, in the case of accident-related repairs, they are comprehensively insured.
In other cases, the owners, who are likely to be more affluent than average, may prefer (and be willing to pay a
premium for) the amenities of a formal garage.
3.3.1   History and turning-points of Thika Jua Kali
In 1988 the Thika Municipal Council required jua kali operators to move out of the town's main market. The
council chose Kigandaini, an area that had been set aside for a fire brigade, as the new jua kali site, and
enterprises began to locate there soon afterwards. Just over half of the present entrepreneurs had established
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themselves in the cluster by the end of 1990. The majority (59%) were new enterprises, while the rest (41%)
were existing businesses moved from elsewhere in Thika town or other parts of the country.
The site, as it was received from the municipality, had no amenities. In the early 1990s, a delegation from
the Belgian government visited the cluster and promised to assist with site upgrading. The association and the
Ministry of Research, Technical Training and Technology entered into intensive negotiations. After many delays,
construction of some 66 permanent workshops finally began in early 1997. To permit the building to take place,
many businesses had to move to temporary quarters outside the main site. The building process has been on-
again-off-again, apparently because of delayed payments to the contractor. As of February 1998, the workshops
remain roofless. An association official estimates the amount spent to date to be in the vicinity of K.shs. 27
million, which, in his opinion, is far too much for the quality of the construction.
Since Kigandaini is a very young cluster, the notion of turning-points has limited validity. Nevertheless, the
major turning-point thus far came with the liberalisation of Kenya's import markets. Market liberalisation has
increased the quantity and variety of both vehicles and spare parts. As far back as the 1960s, Kenya had
imported second-hand vehicles, but their importation was stopped in order to promote local assembly of new
vehicles. Then, from the mid-1980s, the government once again allowed imports. The first entrants were fully
reconditioned vehicles from Japan that required little maintenance, at least initially. Then, with the general
liberalisation of markets, the range of imported vehicles was extended to include what have come to be known
as the Dubai cars. These second-hand vehicles enter Kenya through the free port of Dubai. Since they are not
reconditioned, many quickly develop problems requiring the attention of mechanics such as those in the Thika
Jua Kali. Nearly all (97.6%) of the firms reported that the repair business had increased as a result of
liberalisation.
Liberalisation has also increased the availability and reduced the prices of the spare parts that are the
vehicle repairers' main raw materials. There was general agreement (100% of those responding to the questions)
that spares had been both more easily available and cheap since liberalisation. On the subject of quality,
however, opinions were mixed. Most (72.4%) felt that the quality of available spares had remained the same; the
rest (27.6%) thought quality had deteriorated.
3.3.2   Economic context for vehicle repair in Thika
The market for vehicle repair in Kenya is highly competitive, and is shared by at least three different types of
enterprises. Large, formal garages, mostly associated with the major vehicle assemblers, cater for new vehicles
under warranty and serve the high end of the repair market. These garages offer diagnostic services, provide
their own spare parts, sometimes offer replacement vehicles, and usually guarantee their work. Medium-scale
garages, either free-standing or run in connection with a petrol station, service a wide range of private and
commercial vehicles. Some are general garages, offering most services, while others specialise in particular repair
types. Most stock spares, but also permit customers to purchase spares elsewhere. The final group consists of
individual mechanics and the jua kali enterprises, both of which tend to specialise in a single aspect of repair,
and to service older vehicles.
21
The size of the market is a function of the number of vehicles on the road and their age and/or condition.
The market for vehicle repair also has some geographic boundaries, though reputation, as we will see in the case
of Suame, is capable of widening a cluster's market reach. Thika town and its immediate environs probably have
between 1,500 and 3,000 vehicles in all (McCormick 1998).This fairly small market is shared by all the types of
vehicle repairers named above, including approximately 100 jua kali enterprises in the cluster. Vehicle owners,
especially those travelling regularly between Thika and Nairobi, may also choose to have their vehicles serviced
in Nairobi.
The potential for economies of scale and scope in vehicle repair, as in other activities, depends on the
nature of the work to be done. Vehicle repair is essentially custom production, with each job having its own
character and specifications. Variations in required skills and in the equipment necessary to undertake different
repairs encourage specialisation, especially for smaller firms. Certain types of repair are highly capital and/or
skill intensive, making it difficult to realise economies of scale, especially for a full-service shop.  Inevitably in
the full-service garage, some types of specialised equipment will lie idle much of the time. In Africa, where
capital is very expensive, firms – especially small ones – cannot afford to invest in machinery that is not fully
utilised. Only the largest garages maintain all specialisations in house. Among smaller firms, vehicle repair is
characterised by specialised firms that interlink in a network of subcontracting (Kinyanjui 1996, Burrows 1992).
Thika's vehicle repair firms are so tiny that there is probably ample room for developing scale economies
within the subcontracting system (see Table 3.1). The fact that some firms are running several activities in
tandem suggests the availability of economies of scope. For example, it is not uncommon for an artisan to
undertake wiring repairs, gas welding and electrical welding. Even though these are technically different
specialisations, the need for them occurs often enough in the same vehicle to make the combination a useful
one.
The subcontracting system involves complex market and social factors (Kinyanjui 1997). Economic
considerations dictate that subcontracting will take place, but trust mediates the choice of subcontractors
(Kinyanjui 1998). When subcontracted firms fail to live up to their agreement, the contractor can insist that the
offending firm redo the work, or he can deduct something from the final payment. In extreme cases he can
sever the subcontracting relationship altogether. Since all of these sanctions involve time and threaten social
relations in a close working environment, entrepreneurs would naturally prefer to do business with firms whose
work and honesty they trust. This position is no doubt reinforced by the fact that neither the main contractor
nor the subcontractor can count on the legal system or other institutions to support their claims, even when the
claims are obviously valid.
3.3.3   External economies in Thika Jua Kali
Like most small-enterprise clusters, the Thika Jua Kali attracts customers who know they can find many firms
ready and willing to perform the service(s) they need. Market access is probably the most positive form of
external economy available to firms in this cluster. Over one-third (35.6%) of the entrepreneurs listed
'availability of customers' as the main advantage of their location.
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Thika is drawing an increasing number of trainees and the labour-market pooling is not always helpful.
The data on new startups in the cluster support the contention that Thika's labour-market pooling is leading to
the formation of many new microenterprises in direct competition with existing firms. Over one-third (39.6%)
of the firms were begun in 1991 or later. This seems a very high proportion, even given the fact that the Thika
cluster as a whole is relatively new.
Inputs, especially spare parts, are increasingly available within the cluster. Approximately 15 firms
manufacture simple spare parts such as springs, washers and plastic bushes (Kinyanjui 1996). Others, such as
the cushion makers, are ready to produce items to order. Still others trade in imported and locally made spares.
These spares shops increasingly include in their stock the parts made by the cluster's manufacturers. One dealer
said that, when he first came to the cluster, he bought all of his spare parts from Nairobi. Now he buys battery
latches, springs, and rubber bushes from the Kigandaini manufacturers, and is optimistic that, as the quality of
spares made in the cluster improves, his stock will include more local goods (Kinyanjui 1998).
The technology in the Thika cluster largely depends on the skills of those already there, most of whom
were informally trained (Kinyanjui 1997). The process for skills upgrading is also largely non-formal, consisting
of observation and conversations with those who have a needed skill. As Kinyanjui (1997: 41) points out, 'There
is a tendency of passing on bad practices.' Thus technology spillovers do occur, but the present system does not
provide a mechanism for raising the level of what is shared. Unless this can be changed, technology spillovers,
like labour-market pooling, are likely to be disabling.
3.3.4   Joint action among Thika's jua kali  vehicle repairers
Joint action in the Thika Jua Kali is horizontal. Both bilateral and multilateral linkages have led to effective
action. Despite the presence of manufacturers in the cluster, the only vertical interactions seem to be market-
based. Firms manufacturing spare parts sell them to the spares shops, which, in turn, sell them to repairers and
their customers. There is no evidence that this process includes any other type of inter-firm cooperation or
learning-by-interaction.
The subcontracting system is at the heart of Thika's bilateral joint action. Repairers have production
linkages with each other, and they recognise that being in the cluster facilitates cooperation. A large group
(42.2%) of respondents identified these linkages as the main benefit of the cluster, saying that their work 'is not
done in isolation', that their work 'depends on other repairers', or that 'they cooperate with other repairers'
(McCormick 1998). Since firms tend to keep their subcontracting partners for some time, these relationships
could form the basis for joint action in other areas of mutual concern (Kinyanjui 1998). Whether such joint
action actually occurs, however, is not clear.
Other common forms of horizontal linkages are unlikely to move the cluster forward. Equipment sharing,
for example, is limited to simple borrowing of spanners and wrenches; sharing of workers is occasional.  Most
of the entrepreneurs in Thika have no communication with large garages (Kinyanjui 1997: 41–42; 1998).
The cluster has two associations, each with a different purpose. The Thika Mariko Jua Kali Association is
primarily a welfare association, providing benefits to members in sickness, bereavement, or other difficulty;
while the Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association is a jua kali site association. The impetus for forming the site
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association seems to have been two-fold. At one level, it was simply part of the process mandated by the
government for becoming recognised as jua kali operators. In this sense, the association is one of those initiated
'from above' (Haan 1995). The association also  appears to have roots in local initiative. Some of the operators
who were active in its formation recognised that the site chosen for them had been zoned for another use, and
that the difficult process of relocating might have to be repeated if they failed to deal with the land issue. To its
credit, the association successfully negotiated with the municipality to obtain ownership of the site, though
association officials recognise that aspects of the land tenure issue remain to be resolved (Kinyanjui 1998). The
Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association has continued to be the main source of horizontal multilateral joint action in
the cluster. All of the surveyed entrepreneurs are members, and all but one (97.8%) say they attend meetings
called by the association (McCormick 1998).
3.3.5  Thika Jua Kali :  summary and conclusions
The cluster shows strong production linkages. Small-scale vehicle repair is generally characterised by extensive
subcontracting, and Thika is no exception. In the view of the entrepreneurs themselves, location near those
doing other types of repairs is a key benefit of the cluster. They recognise and value their interdependence.
The Thika jua kali cluster is still very young. Its main problem is that the market for vehicle repair is fairly
small. This small market and the disabling effects of labour-market pooling have combined to create very small
firms that are probably not able to realise economies of scale. One of the greatest needs appears to be skill
development. The present non-formal learning process in use to develop skills among practising vehicle
repairers could be a model for skill-upgrading training. What appears to be needed is a way to bring new
content into that process.
Even though this cluster has two associations, it is vulnerable to manipulation by powerful outsiders,
especially government and donors. The situation with the workshops funded by the Belgian government is a
case in point. Encouraged by the promise of an improvement in their working conditions, the association
welcomed the Belgian initiative. Now, over a year after construction began, many businesses are operating in
worse conditions than before while they wait for the promised workshops. Association officials recognise that
they are unlikely to get all that was promised, yet they feel powerless to do anything about it because they
believe that the ministry entrusted with protecting their interests has derailed the project. If and when the
workshops are finally finished, the association may face even bigger problems. Since the number of workshops
under construction will allow only about one firm in five to benefit from the new facility, most association
members are likely to be very unhappy.
4   INDUSTRIALISING CLUSTERS
The second group of clusters consists of a metalwork cluster in Kumasi, Ghana, and two vehicle repair clusters,
one in Nairobi and the other in Kumasi. These clusters in many ways resemble the three already described, but
the greater specialisation and differentiation of firms leads to bilateral production linkages and, ultimately, to
higher efficiency. Higher level technologies in at least some of the firms set the stage for positive technological
spillovers. Although associations are present in these clusters, their activities sometimes get derailed, either by
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internal power struggles or by external forces. The most active associations extend their concerns beyond basic
supply-side matters to markets and technology.
4.1   Metalwork in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana)
Dawson (1988, 1992) described a cluster in Suame, a northern suburb of Kumasi. The cluster, known locally as
'Suame Magazine' because its original site once housed a military magazine,  is involved in two activities:
metalwork and vehicle repair. The working population of the magazine was estimated to be 40,000 in the mid
1980s, of which 8,000 were shop-owning proprietors. These numbers do not include the spare-parts dealers and
metal traders.
Traditionally, the 'Magazine' craftsmen were involved in vehicle repair, with a small number of blacksmiths
also producing basic agricultural tools, charcoal stoves, and other simple metal goods. Out of this base of
blacksmithing has evolved a group of firms involved in various types of metal-work manufacturing. All of the
metal-working firms spend at least some of their time doing repair and maintenance work, but all are also
manufacturers. Dawson (1988) categorised them into three groups: blacksmiths who used clay and brick forges
and hand tools, a middle group who had achieved a modest level of technological enhancement, mostly with the
use of locally made machines, and a group using machine tools, including at least one lathe, that Dawson calls
'engineering' workshops.
4.1.1   History and turning-points of Suame metalwork cluster
The site owes its existence to the forced removal of businesses from the centre of Kumasi in the 1950s and
1960s. The first turning-point came with the retreat of Ghana's formal economy from the mid-1970s onwards
when 'even the least ambitious blacksmith added new products to his range or, at the very least, increased the
volume of his production' (Dawson 1988: 27). Entrepreneurs saw vehicles lacking parts that could no longer be
imported, and attempted to fabricate suitable spares. Others saw the need for food processing or agricultural
equipment, and copied existing imported models.
The market liberalisation of the mid-1980s was not uniform in its effects on the firms in the cluster.
Declining markets and increased competition brought about the extremely low barriers to entry, drove many
blacksmiths out of business, and reduced incomes for many others. Middle-level firms, especially those whose
products were significantly inferior to their imported counterparts, were also affected. For both of these groups,
therefore, the mid-1980s represented a sharply negative turning-point in their operations. The engineering firms,
on the other hand, fared much better. Their higher level technology enabled them to capture markets from both
large domestic industry and from imports.
4.1.2   Economic context for Suame metalwork
Markets for the Suame cluster's products vary considerably. The bolts and nuts, brackets, springs, and
agricultural implements produced by the blacksmiths have wider markets than the more specialised output of
the engineering workshops. By the mid-1980s, both groups of products were competing with the flood of
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imports brought by liberalisation. Contrary to the expectations of many, goods produced in Suame fared well in
competition with similar items from Eastern Europe and India.
Suame metalwork firms have probably not captured all available scale economies. The average size for
developing country firms is 15.4 workers (see Table 2.1 above). In Suame, the first two groups of producers
average approximately 5 workers, while even the more sophisticated engineering workshops have only 7
workers each.13 This suggests that the cluster's firms might benefit by expanding or by creating inter-firm
division of labour through specialisation.
The fact that all of Kumasi's metal-working enterprises spend at least some of their time doing repair and
maintenance work suggests the existence of internal economies of scope. Such work complements firms'
manufacturing activities by enabling them to utilise resources, especially  labour, that might otherwise be idle.
Problems associated with contract enforcement lead firms to prefer either cash payments or dealing with
known persons (Fafchamps 1996). Suame's smallest firms take deposits from clients, on accepting their orders,
to cover the costs of materials. The greater a firm's output and the larger its client-base, the less likely it
becomes that it will be able to rely on such pre-financing arrangements (Dawson 1988: 33).
4.1.3   External economies in the Suame metalwork cluster
As with the other small-enterprise clusters, market access is one of the major benefits of clustering. Dawson
(1988: 32) observes that marketing is the metalworkers' greatest weakness. The firms make few efforts to
advertise themselves and depend on informal contacts to spread their reputation. Obviously in such a situation,
location in a place where they are likely to be seen and perhaps pick up some passing trade is especially
beneficial.
Suame producers, like those in Kamukunji, have benefited from the availability of inputs. The cluster has 'a
large number' of traders of new and scrap metals (Dawson 1988: 11). Although some firms use domestically
produced steel rods and a limited amount of new steel imported by individual traders, the bulk of the materials
used in the cluster are scrap (Dawson 1988: 31). As large firms began to be rehabilitated in the mid-1980s,
supplies of scrap increased, then decreased as the pace with which old worn-out equipment was replaced
slowed.
The size of Suame firms, which average 5–6 workers, suggests that labour-market pooling might be a more
positive feature of the cluster than is the case in Kamukunji. Suame attracted two types of labour. The first
consisted of workers who were apprenticed to small firms, many of them in Suame itself. Most (80%) of the
workers in blacksmithing and middle-level metalworking firms, and about half (52%) of those in engineering
firms fell into this category. The second type of labour available in Suame had higher level technical skills
gained in large-firm apprenticeships and technical training institutes. Although these constituted a minority of
workers, even in engineering firms, their presence has allowed the cluster to produce some items that compete
favourably with imports.
There is little evidence that technological spillovers were significant, despite the fact that a small group of
firms – the engineering group – was upgrading and benefitting from the Technology Consultancy Centre (TCC).
The TCC helped engineering firms by importing machine tools and assisting in product development. Although
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the blacksmiths and artisanal metalworkers occasionally made use of products made by local machine shops,
they themselves continued to use old technology and were largely unaffected by the technological upgrading
going on around them (Dawson 1992:38).
4.1.4   Joint action among Suame metalworkers
Suame's metalwork firms seem not to have strong linkages with each other, perhaps as a result of the wide
variation within the group. Whatever the cause, there appear to be few horizontal or vertical linkages. There is
no sectoral association of metalworkers. Rather the metalworkers are included under the umbrella of the Suame
Garages Association described below. The problem with this, as with site associations in general, is that it is
difficult for an association to represent  well the interests of firms as diverse as upholsterers and engineering
workshops (Dawson 1988: 46; Haan 1995). The metalworkers are similarly lacking in bilateral cooperation. A
few of the more successful small enterprises established contacts with larger firms through their participation in
the 1983 Industry and Technology Fair. In general, however, such joint action is rare.
4.1.5    Suame metalwork cluster:  summary and conclusions
The Suame metalworking cluster is large and diverse. A minority of firms is technologically sophisticated
enough to be labelled 'engineering.' All of these use machine tools and most are equipped with at least one lathe.
The rest of the cluster operates at a fairly low technological level.
The analysis of potential external economies reveals a mixture of positive and negative effects. Being in the
cluster facilitates market access and acquisition of intermediate inputs for the firms. Labour-market pooling,
however,  has resulted in atomisation of low-level firms, rather than the development of specialised ones. The
Technology Consultancy Centre, which might have been a source of general technological spillovers, apparently
had an impact only on the small group of engineering firms.
Linkages among Suame's metalworking firms and/or between these firms and others outside the cluster
are weak. There is no association of metalworkers within the cluster, and little evidence of bilateral cooperation.
The two firms with significant contacts outside the cluster were exceptional.
4.2   Vehicle Repair in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana)
Dawson (1988) also described vehicle repair activities in Suame. Kumasi is a major centre for vehicle repair,
attracting vehicles, not only from other parts of Ghana, but also from Niger, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire. Suame
started as a vehicle repair centre and has gained a reputation for cheap, flexible service. At the time of Dawson's
research in early 1988, 52% of the firms in the cluster were involved in some type of vehicle work.
4.2.1    History and turning-points for vehicle repair in Suame
Kumasi has a long history in vehicle repair. In the 1950s and 1960s, five domestic and multinational concerns
located large garages in the town. Until the early 1970s these garages dominated the local market for private
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vehicle repair. Magazine fitters, who were generally at a low level of technical skills, undertook only minor
repairs and conversions of lorries into passenger-carrying vehicles.
The first turning-point for Suame came with the 1972–73 budget, which imposed tight restrictions on the
importation of new vehicles and parts (Dawson 1988: 21). The large garages, which were capital intensive and
dependent on imported inputs, suffered, and small firms in places like Suame were able to fill the gap.
Furthermore, economic mismanagement encouraged an active black market in vehicle spares, which broke the
monopoly of the large garages and opened up opportunities to small firms.
From the mid-1970s, the range of clients and the type of service demanded from small firms began to
widen. Large and small, public and private organisations sent their vehicles for repair to Kumasi, because it was
the only place where vehicle spares were consistently available. Vehicles were even brought in from
neighbouring countries.  Imported spares were obtainable on the black market and when they were not, artisans
improvised. Furthermore, Suame repairs were also cheap because firms evaded minimum-wage laws and
income taxes. Since many of the artisans were present or former employees of large firms, the work was
generally of a reasonable quality.
The boom continued, with minor interruptions, until the mid-1980s when the Economic Recovery
Programme (ERP) took hold. Reforms in the import and currency markets encouraged the importation of spare
parts, vehicle components, and entire vehicles. Although the majority of the spares went to the large commercial
and corporate garages, these garages did not regain their former supremacy. The corporate garages were busier
than they used to be because the corporations they served had more vehicles on the road, but this increase in
activity seems not to have affected adversely the small firms in Suame. What did suppress demand for repairs
was rising parts prices combined with a fall in the purchasing power of many vehicle owners. From the mid to
the late 1980s nearly 70% of the sampled firms experienced a fall in demand and many went out of business
(Dawson 1988: 24).
4.2.3   Economic context for vehicle repair in Suame
The market for vehicle repair in Kumasi consists of the government, private firms and organisations, and
individuals. Most (96%), however,  described their customer base as consisting largely of individuals. During the
1970s when Suame established its reputation, the number of vehicles was shrinking, but their poor condition,
the access of Suame to spares, and the availability of cheap fuel led to high demand for its services. After the
introduction of the ERP, Ghana's vehicle fleet grew, vehicles were in better condition (though hardly new),
imported spares competed directly with Suame-made spares, and some of the larger garages started operating
again.
The market for vehicle repair is highly competitive. Estimates are not completely reliable, but probably at
least three thousand of Suame's reported five thousand workshops are involved in some aspect of vehicle repair.
Add to this the few large garages that had resumed operations by the mid-1980s and small and medium
workshops in other parts of Kumasi, and the result is intense competition. Most firms seemed to just wait for
business to come to them, but Dawson (1988: 25) describes two entrepreneurs who maintained linkages over a
number of years with larger firms and state-owned enterprises which did not have their own garage facilities.
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These were the only two firms reporting an increase in business in the 1985–1988 period. Apparently the links
gave them a competitive advantage in Suame's otherwise ruthless competition.
The vehicle repairers in Suame followed a pattern of specialisation similar to those in Thika. The largest
group of firms were the mechanics (39.5% of the enterprises); straighteners and welders were next (25.4%),
followed by upholsterers (8.4%), electricians (8.1%), sprayers (7.8%), and others (8.9%). Joint production
through subcontracting should allow the cluster to reap the benefits of scale economies, even as the size of
individual firms remains small.
Firms' exchange relations with suppliers and customers changed from the 1970s to the 1980s as a result of
changes in Ghana's economic environment. During the 1970s, much of Suame operated on the fringes of
legality. The firms, of necessity, used black market spares and, like many small businesses in developing
countries, they failed to comply  with labour laws and other regulations. When the new government that came
to power in 1979 promised to attack corruption and the black market, many entrepreneurs began turning down
work coming from government ministries and state-owned enterprises. By the mid-1980s, market liberalisation
had reduced the need for black market spares, so on at least that front, the vehicle repair firms were able to
operate more freely.
Dawson (1988: 23) claims that small enterprise in Ghana had 'traditionally' been heavily dependent on
credit, with materials and parts often purchased and jobs done on a 'pay later' basis.  This also began to change
with the economic reforms introduced in the 1980s. As the government tightened the money supply, offering
credit became more expensive and was consequently less common.
4.2.4   External economies in Suame Magazine
Market access is, once again, a major external economy. The concentration of vehicle repair firms brings
customers. This apparently offsets the lack of advertising or other forms of marketing (Dawson 1988: 17).
Like Thika, Suame appears vulnerable to disabling labour-market pooling. Many young people train as
apprentices, but instead of joining an existing business and thus enabling it to realise economies of scale, they
most often set up their own business in direct competition with their former master. Nevertheless Suame's
vehicle repairers manage to achieve greater efficiency than many small-enterprise clusters because the overall
volume of business seems greater and the subcontracting system enables the small enterprises as a group to
achieve basic scale economies.
The supply of intermediate inputs changed drastically with liberalisation. Before liberalisation, firms used
either scrap metal from old vehicles, which was readily available from vehicles abandoned as beyond repair in
Suame, or black market spare parts. Since liberalisation, these have been replaced by three new lines of supply:
'imitation parts' from Nigeria; relatively low price, low quality parts from Eastern Europe, India, and China; and,
increasingly, parts made in the machine shops in Suame itself. These last include locally manufactured bolts and
nuts, brass bushes, exhaust pipes, axle-shafts, and various body brackets (Dawson 1988: 23). These machine
shops also recondition and/or manufacture parts on a one-off basis. The intermediate input effects are closely
linked to market access in this case. When spares were difficult to get, customers knew that they would
somehow be available in Suame, and this reputation for availability of needed parts attracted customers.
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The small engineering workshops in the metalwork sector have  contributed substantially to the
technological capability of small vehicle repairers (Riedel and Schmitz 1989: 147; Dawson 1992: 37–38). The
ability of these small machine shops to make both machines used in the repair process and vehicle spare parts
has enabled the repairers using those goods to occupy niches that would otherwise  be beyond their reach. Not
all garages have, or even need, higher technology.  Dawson (1992: 38) reports that, although the engineering
workshops are important, they are few, and most garages continued to use the same hand tools as before. What
is important is that the technology is present somewhere within the Magazine so that it can be tapped when
needed.
4.2.5   Joint action among Suame vehicle repairers
The Suame vehicle repair cluster is characterised by extensive horizontal subcontracting linkages as well as by
vertical linkages with the engineering firms producing spare parts. Subcontracting has linked small firms within
Suame, and resulted in joint production. Although the Suame Magazine was begun by former employees of
large firms, there is little contact between these large firms and Suame's small garages.
Strong vertical bilateral linkages between garages and metal workshops, mostly the engineering firms, lead
to another form of joint production. A mechanic in need of a part goes to an engineering workshop carrying the
old part. The workshop may either rework the existing part or make a new one using the old as a model. The
mechanic then fits the part and continues with the rest of the repair job.
The Ministry of Industries created the Suame Garages Association in 1983 to act as a two-way
communication channel between government and artisans, as well as a delivery vehicle for programmes of
assistance (Dawson 1988: 46). At the time of the research the association was helping to select enterprises which
were to benefit from a World Bank transport sector credit line. It was also involved in nominating candidates
for courses at the National Vocational Training Institute and Management Development and Productivity
Institute. In both instances, the association was having difficulties; this may be, as Dawson suggests, because it
represents too wide a diversity of trades and activities with firms of too many sizes and types. It may also be
that the association, as a creation of Government, lacks legitimacy and the support of its members.
4.2.6   Suame vehicle repair cluster:  summary and conclusions
Despite a growing market and fairly impressive technological capability in some of its engineering workshops,
most firms experienced a fall in demand and many went out of business. Dawson (1988: 24) rightly observes
that Suame may be a victim of its own success. Its reputation as a thriving centre for small-scale enterprise
attracts trainees and potential entrepreneurs in large numbers, with the result that most end up in enterprises too
small to be efficient.
Linkages between metalwork manufacturers and vehicle repair firms within Suame have probably helped
the cluster to do as well as it has, but they have not been strong enough to enable it to weather the cut-throat
competition that has developed. The skills developed in the engineering workshops when spares were difficult
to obtain continue to serve the cluster well, because the existence of the local workshops enable vehicle
repairers to take on jobs that would otherwise have to be done in one of the large garages. There is some
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indication (only 2 firms!) that linkages between small and large firms are important (see Alila and McCormick
1997). The lesson here may, however, not lie in the linkage. Rather, the important point may be that these two
firms developed active marketing strategies that enabled them to avoid the intense competition that was
enmeshing most of their counterparts. The Suame Garages Association, on the other hand, has not been an
effective vehicle for joint action. Government and donors have planned assistance packages without adequate
consultation, and the small vehicle repairers seem unable to organise for their effective use.
4.3   Vehicle Repair in Ziwani (Kenya)
Ziwani is a cluster in the Eastlands of Nairobi. At the time of the research in 1996–97, the cluster had 506
enterprises crowded into a 1.2-acre site. All were small, and all were engaged in vehicle repair or spare parts
manufacture (McCormick et al. 1996).
Working spaces within the cluster are allocated on the basis of 11 named specialisations. According to
Kinyanjui (1997), general mechanics represent the largest proportion of Ziwani repairers (22.4% of the total),
followed closely by panel beaters (20.2%), spray painters (18.2%), vehicle-wiring specialists (18.2%), and gas
and electrical welders (8.1%). Four other specialisations account for only 12.9% of the enterprises.14
All types of vehicles are repaired in Ziwani. All firms report repairing heavy lorries, 97% repair matatus, and
94.9% repair private saloon cars. The vehicles are mostly over six years old, and many firms said that they often
repair vehicles in the 16–20 year age range. In Nairobi as in Thika, newer vehicles are more likely to be repaired
in the large formal garages.
4.3.1   History and turning-points
Ziwani shares part of its history with Kamukunji. The cluster was founded by entrepreneurs relocated from
other parts of Nairobi in 1972 (Kinyanjui 1996:14–15). Another influx of artisans from the Grogan site arrived
in 1978, and there was a spurt of firm formation in 1989–90. These combined with a rather steady pattern of
new business startups to bring the total to its present 500+ enterprises.
The cluster has experienced two major turning-points. The first coincided with the 1985 legitimation of the
jua kali.  The president's action and the resulting changes in attitudes brought about growth and improved
infrastructure in the Ziwani cluster. Ziwani was also one of the early beneficiaries of the Kenya Government's
Jua Kali Shed Programme described earlier. The second turning-point came with market liberalisation and the
accompanying massive importing of second-hand vehicles and spare parts.
4.3.2   Economic contfext for Ziwani vehicle repair
As in Thika, the market for vehicle repair is shared by the large formal garages, medium-scale garages, and small
shops, including the jua kali enterprises. Also similar to Thika is the concentration on the repair of older
vehicles. Heavy commercial vehicles and matatus predominate, but nearly all Ziwani firms also repair private
saloon cars.
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The overall market for vehicle repair is much larger in Nairobi than in Thika. Nairobi's population,
estimated at 1.8 million in 1996, extrapolates to a vehicle population of at least 28,000. The fact that Nairobi is
the industrial and commercial capital of Kenya as well as its political capital suggests  that the vehicle
population may actually be much higher. Furthermore, the main trunk road system, centered in Nairobi, is
estimated to carry up to 90% of the country's heavy truck traffic (World Bank 1995). Of course, the population
of mechanics is also considerably larger than Thika's, and without a full census it is difficult to estimate the
degree of market saturation.
Most Ziwani vehicle repairers (78.1%) specialise in only one of the 11 repair types. The rest undertake
between two and four different repair activities. As in Thika, some of the combinations appear to fit together
and are often stages of a single repair job. This happens, for example, when a firm specialising in panel beating
also does spray painting, or a wiring specialist also does welding. Such combinations may result in economies of
scope, especially in cases where there is not enough demand to permit a firm to expand with a single
specialisation.
Ziwani firms, with a mean of only 1.5 workers, are more like the firms in Thika than those in Suame,
Kumasi, which average 6.5 workers (Kinyanjui 1996). This suggests that there may be unrealised economies of
scale in Ziwani.
Contract enforcement is important in Ziwani, because of the extensive use of subcontracting. When the
subcontractor defaults or fails to perform to the required standard, the main contractor may handle the problem
himself or the contract parties can request the Ziwani Jua Kali Association to arbitrate. The association's
willingness to enter into the role of arbiter of disputes between member firms is an important step towards
institution building. By providing sanctions for firms that attempt to act opportunistically, the Ziwani
association is reducing the risks of doing business with its members and strengthening the overall business
environment. Trust remains a key factor in the selection of subcontract firms, but the development of a
mediation process allows firms to move (using Zucker's [1986] categories) from process– and/or characteristic-
based trust towards institutionally-based trust.
4.3.3   External economies
As with most small-enterprise clusters, the geographical concentration in Ziwani brings major benefits in the
form of market access. Kinyanjui (1997) reports that nearly half (46.1%) of customers simply arrive at the
repairer's place of work. The rest are brought by other customers (40.4%) or by friends (13.5%). When asked
the advantages of being in the cluster, all of the businesses named 'availability of customers' either first or
second.
Three-quarters (75.5%) of the entrepreneurs in Ziwani had no occupation before starting their present
business and a sizeable majority (69.9%) of the artisans were trained in Ziwani itself (Kinyanjui 1997, 1998).
These facts suggest that, like Suame and Thika, Ziwani could suffer from disabling labour-market pooling .
Closer investigation, however, shows that relatively few firms are the recent startups one would expect to find if
young people were going into business in Ziwani immediately after training. The firms that were founded in
1991 or later (14% of the total) are hardly enough to cause a major competitive threat to existing entrepreneurs.
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Ziwani includes 30 manufacturing firms producing vehicle parts, machines, and household goods
(McCormick et al. 1996). The vehicle parts manufactured include silencers, rubber bushes, chassis, and car seat
cushions.  The two spares shops run by the association stock these local manufactures as well as imported
and/or domestic spares. Despite the presence of shops in the cluster, three-quarters (75.8%) of the repairers buy
spares on Kirinyaga Road, an area known for its high concentration of autospares shops, and half (50.5%)
purchase some spares in the industrial area.  All in all, autospares are readily available to Ziwani firms.
In general, Ziwani's potential for technological spillovers is very similar to that of Thika. Vehicle repairers
readily share ideas and information about repair procedures, but what they share is limited by their lack of
current technical knowledge. The choice of Ziwani by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO) for its training facility offers the promise at least of technological upgrading. UNIDO has sponsored
the building of a training facility for skill development and also provided equipment for use in Ziwani. The
building was originally projected to have been completed by mid-1997, but is unlikely to be ready before mid-
1998.
4.3.4   Joint action
As with vehicle repair elsewhere, the subcontracting system in Ziwani gives rise to horizontal linkages among
small firms with different specialisations. Almost all (99%) of the firms  subcontracted work out, and an equally
high proportion reported receiving subcontracts (Kinyanjui 1998). Subcontracting relationships are long-lasting.
Over one-quarter of the enterprises (26.8%) said that they never change subcontractors, while more than half
(59.8%) said that they change only infrequently.
Other bilateral linkages are weak or non-existent. Approximately one-quarter (24.7%) of the Ziwani firms
reported exchanging equipment with other enterprises (McCormick et al. 1996). There may be somewhat less
bilateral sharing than in other clusters because the Ziwani Association has purchased some items that it makes
available to members. Like their counterparts in Thika, Ziwani entrepreneurs have few links with vehicle
assemblers or large-scale garages (Kinyanjui 1998).
Ziwani entrepreneurs have strong multilateral linkages through the Ziwani Jua Kali Association. All (100%)
enterprises in Ziwani are members. The association is involved in the general management and administration
of the cluster  (Kinyanjui 1996: 15–16). As already described, the association acts as a mediator in disputes
between member enterprises. It is also attempting to improve the image of the cluster by strengthening general
discipline within and around the site and by taking measures to control theft and the sale of stolen vehicle parts.
This is being done, according to association officials, in order to make the cluster more attractive to potential
customers.
The Ziwani Jua Kali Association has spearheaded several other specific joint actions.  To ensure security of
tenure for the enterprises, it purchased the Ziwani site from the Nairobi City Council. The association has also
purchased industrial gas cylinders which it makes available to members, thus reducing their capital costs. In
1997, it enabled members to obtain Kenya's new identification cards with minimum effort, by arranging for
registration to be carried out at the Ziwani site.
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The Ziwani association is, however,  not without its problems. In 1996 the secretary absconded with a
large sum of money, leaving the members demoralised. The present leadership appears to be honest, but it has
not been successful in all its undertakings. Despite improvements in organisation, Ziwani still has a clear jua kali
image that frightens away many potential customers. The association is also engaged in a dispute over the land
that is taking a considerable amount of the officials' time. In an important effort at future planning, it applied
for a bank loan to enable it to purchase diagnostic equipment for repairing the Dubai cars. When the application
was refused on the grounds that the association had no legal standing to borrow, the officials turned to the
government for help. Here also they were rebuffed. It seems that MRTTT sees these businesses as jua kali that
should not aspire to major upgrading. The association now intends to ask a donor for funds so that it can buy
the equipment without involving either banks or government.
4.3.5   Ziwani motor mechanics: summary and conclusions
Currently the main external economy available to the Ziwani vehicle repair cluster is market access. The
atmosphere is ripe for positive technological spillovers, but neither the promised training programme nor the
high-tech equipment needed for diagnosing and repairing new vehicles appear to be forthcoming.
The strength of the cluster is in its linkages. Like its counterparts in Thika and Suame, the cluster is
characterised by strong production linkages. Nearly all of the firms give and receive subcontracts. Much
subcontracting is a sharing of work based on firm specialisations, but a small proportion represents sharing of
jobs within a given specialisation, usually because an entrepreneur has more work than he can handle. As a
result, Ziwani's artisans seem to be able to work efficiently enough to compete in Nairobi's vehicle-repair
market. Nevertheless, the fact remains that these enterprises are tiny, even compared with other African vehicle
repairers. The issue of mergers or other types of combinations to achieve greater scale economies did not come
up in this research.
The Ziwani Jua Kali Association has followed through on the difficult process of purchasing the Ziwani
site, and is now seeking funds to enable the cluster to invest in new technology. It is this last effort that may
prove most telling. If they can obtain the equipment and related training to enable them to enter successfully
into the market for repair of the current generation of vehicles, the jua kali will have reached a new level of
acceptability and integration into the process of Kenyan industrialisation.
The cluster repairs all types of vehicles. This means that its market is potentially as wide as Nairobi. In fact,
most vehicles presently repaired in Ziwani are old even by Kenyan standards. association officials believe that,
to attract the owners of  newer vehicles, the cluster will require both technological upgrading and an improved
image. Recognition of the need to attract customers is one thing  that sets the Ziwani association apart from
most small-enterprise associations. It is a positive development that deserves support.
5   DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS
Clusters that either include medium or large firms, or have clear links to such firms or to other larger
organisations appear to be rare in Africa. The secondary literature yielded  only two clear examples of such
diversified industrial clusters. Both are in South Africa, and both produce garments. One, the Western Cape
34
clothing cluster, was well described and is included here. The second garment cluster is based in Durban. Since
the available study analyses only a portion of it – a concentration of subcontractors in Port Shepstone (Harrison
1997) – an assessment of the cluster as a whole was not possible. The third example, Kenya's Lake Victoria fish
processing industry, comes from our own research.
5.1   The Clothing Industry in the Western Cape (South Africa)
South Africa's Western Cape accounts for 45% of local clothing production and half of the country's total
clothing exports. It also dominates the production of higher-quality, 'fashion' clothing (Wilkens and Kane 1997).
October (1996: 17) argues that the proximity of retailers and manufacturing in the Western Cape is the cluster's
most important feature. He believes that the presence of the large retailers and the manufacturers' almost total
reliance on these distribution channels has affected the size and structure of the firms in the industry, the state
of the region's design capacity, its quality standards, and the development of highly dependent subcontracting
and marketing relationships.
5.1.1   History and turning-points of the Western Cape clothing cluster
Until the 1920s, clothing in South Africa was either imported or tailored (October 1996). The beginnings of the
cluster seem to be associated with the development of the textile industry in the Western Cape. Whatever the
original impetus was, the cluster has grown from 30 factories employing 3,500 workers in 1935, to  over 500
factories with 47,000 workers in 1994 (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 :    Western Cape Clothing Factories
Year Factories Employees
1935   30   3,500
1940   40   4,772
1950 104 13,204
1960 166 19,787
1970 253 37,743
1980 332 53,421
1990 433 54,267
1994 538 46,868
Source:  October 1996: 6
The data in Table 5.1 suggest two turning-points in the history of the Western Cape clothing cluster. The first
was in the 1940s when the number of factories and workers nearly tripled. According to October (1996), import
difficulties during World War II account for this major expansion in the domestic clothing industry. The cluster
continued to grow steadily for the next three decades. Employment nearly doubled during the 1960s, and
increased by 42% in the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, growth slowed. The 1990s have witnessed a drop in
total employment despite increases both in the number of firms and in exports.
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October (1996: 6–7) explains the latest turning-point in terms of the opening up of the South African
economy. The decline in production and employment, he believes, was mainly due to an increase in imports of
new and second-hand clothing. After a small improvement between 1993 and 1994, employment declined again
in 1995–96 due to further tariff reductions and illegal imports. Exports also increased, but still account for only
10% of local production.
5.1.2   Economic context for clothing production in the Western Cape
Clothing is a buyer-driven industry. The organisation of the industry, types of interfirm cooperation, and profit
levels are primarily determined in the case of South Africa, by the major retailers, design houses, and foreign
buyers (October 1996: 16). South African markets are much more developed than those in other African
countries. This is not surprising, since both per capita incomes and populations are higher.  South Africa's 1995
per capita income of US$3,160 was over six times the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, and its population of
41.5 million is the fourth largest on the African continent  (World Bank 1997). South Africa's superior
infrastructure and well-developed retail sector also mean that clothing producers can more easily reach a
national market.
The size of the firms in this cluster suggests that obvious economies of scale have already been realised
(see Table 5.1). The cluster contains a mix of firms of different sizes and levels of integration (Wilkens and
Kane 1997). The largest share of production and employment is concentrated in a few large firms. The 20
largest firms have more than 300 workers;  66 firms have 100 to 300 employees each. At the low end of the
cluster structure are 138 firms with between 5 and 100 workers and 146 firms with fewer than 5 employees.
Almost half of these small firms are subcontractors. There has been a significant increase in the number of
home-based 'Cut, Make, and Trim' firms (CMTs) in the past five years. October (1996: 25) mentions the
existence of 'mini clusters' of up to 100 small firms within the region. Such mini-clusters seem to consist of
firms with similar specialisations and/or characteristics.
On the surface, South Africa appears to have better developed institutions than most Sub-Saharan African
countries. We would, therefore, expect trust to be higher and the institutions governing exchange to be more
facilitative. The unevenness of South African development, however, makes it difficult to judge the extent to
which specific business owners can rely on the institutions to support their entrepreneurial activity.
Specific arrangements in force in the CMT trade favour the agents and larger producers. The general
practice is for marketing agents to give and receive production orders. Broken agreements between marketing
agents and CMTs usually centre on late deliveries and/or poor product quality. In such cases, the CMT firm is
liable for a daily penalty for lateness and must bear the cost of rejected goods.
5.1.3   External economies in the Western Cape clothing cluster
External economies in the Western Cape cluster appear fairly strong. Eighty percent of firms identified the close
proximity to retailers, availability of skilled labour, and access to specialised services as advantages to locating in
the Western Cape (October 1996: 21). Although some firms are technologically advanced and even welcome
others to see their factories, technological spillovers did not rate highly as an advantage of the cluster.
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Access to the market may be the major benefit of locating in the Western Cape clothing cluster. Since only
a small proportion of firms export, access to the retail chains that dominate the domestic market is a decided
benefit for any firm. The headquarters of all but one of these major chains are located in the cluster, as are the
major mass suppliers to the lower and mid-upper ends of the market. The Western Cape cluster is the main
supplier to these chains.
The cluster contains nearly 47,000 employees of garment firms, and an additional 23,000 workers in related
industries (October 1996: 7). This certainly seems to be a significant pool of labour available to the garment
industry. It is not, however, clear from the description of the cluster what skills these workers have and whether
skill levels have been increasing.
Although the cluster includes textile firms, and a large number of specialist firms linked to the clothing
industry, such as fabric printers, suppliers of trims, and vendors of new and second-hand machinery, clothing
producers obtained less than one-quarter (22.4%) of their intermediate inputs from within the region (October
1996).
The introduction of the latest technology in the industry has been limited to large- and medium-sized firms
who have mainly adopted computerised pattern designing, marking, and grading (October 1996).  Most small
firms, on the other hand, have no specialised machinery. The closure rate for small firms is also very high,
limiting the possibility of technological spillovers from the larger enterprises.
A characteristic of the Western Cape Clothing Cluster, which sets it apart from many of the enterprise
clusters discussed in this paper, is the ease with which information is disseminated. October (1996: 14) reports
that 'all firms interviewed had visited other factories to look at new technology or different forms of work
organisation such as just-in-time.' One of the large, technologically advanced firms, has an open door policy and
welcomes a large number of firms to its factories.
5.1.4   Joint action in the Western Cape clothing cluster
The Western Cape cluster has extensive horizontal and vertical linkages that have resulted in various forms of
joint action. Horizontal cooperation between firms at similar stages of the production process is common
(October 1996: 13–15). Firms cooperate to handle large orders, present joint clothing ranges, share information,
use marketing agents jointly, and lend machinery. Cooperation on producing for the export market is growing.
The cluster is also characterised by specialisation and subcontracting. Design houses, firms specialising in
cutting services, and a large number of pleating firms have emerged in the last decade or so. Subcontracting in
the cluster falls into one of two categories: operations which require highly specialised equipment and skilled
labour, and operations which are simple and labour-intensive.
Horizontal multilateral cooperation is institutionalised in various associations and organisations. There are
two employer organisations: the Cape Clothing Manufactures Association (CCMA) and the Garment
Manufacturers Association  (October 1996: 15) The CCMA represents mainly the larger and more established
manufacturers. In 1994, it had a membership of 108 firms, or 35% of all firms registered with the Industrial
Council. The Garment Manufacturers Association (GMA) represents just over 40 small firms. Another
association, the Mitchells Plain Garment Manufacturers Association, has recently emerged. The associations are
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active in industrial relations, but they are also attempting to undertake new roles, including the screening of
foreign exports of fabrics and other inputs, small firm development, and the dissemination of information. The
GMA is frequently used as a source of information by manufacturers needing specialised CMTs. The
relationships formed within the association have also led to sharing of orders, passing on of work, and sharing
of information (October 1996: 16).
The Western Cape cluster has significant vertical linkages. One of the changes in the cluster noted by
October (1996) was the growing cooperation between retailers and manufacturers on clothing design and fabric
selection. Such bilateral cooperation is accompanied by vertical joint action among groups of firms. Groups of
companies who are not direct competitors use the same agent to market their products. These are used mainly
by the medium-sized companies to obtain orders from retailers located outside of Cape Town.  A potentially
more important type of agent has arisen in the export market. A number of companies in Cape Town who
export to Germany are using the same agents. According to one of the companies interviewed, these agents play
an important role in transferring information and design techniques, and ensuring quality standards (October
1996: 15).
5.1.5   The Western Cape clothing cluster:  summary and conclusions
Understanding the distribution channels and the role of traders is particularly important for analysing the
Western Cape clothing cluster. Retailers are crucial to the domestic market and a new type of marketing agent
could become key to gaining the cluster a place in the world market.
The cluster has, over its fairly long history, developed significant external economies. Location within this
cluster brings clear benefits of market access, availability of intermediate inputs, labour-market pooling, and, to
a lesser extent, technological spillovers. Technological spillovers have the potential to be significant, especially
since large firms seem very willing to share information with one another. Benefits from all of these external
economies mainly accrue to the large and medium-scale producers.
Cooperation between large and medium-scale producers is beneficial to all, but small firms in the cluster
appear to be  relegated to low-profit activities that give them little opportunity to develop. Small-firm joint
action, on the other hand, is weak. The main association of smaller firms – the Garment Manufacturers
Association – has only 40 members. A second one is forming, but it is localised in the Mitchell's Plain Hive, so
it may not have cluster-wide impact.
Few firms are exporting. Small firms seem least likely to enter export markets on their own and may not
benefit much from doing CMT work for larger exporters. An important development in the cluster is the
emergence of a new type of agent who serves the exporting firms by transferring information, disseminating
design techniques and ensuring quality.
5.2   Fishing and Fish Processing at Lake Victoria
Kenya's Lake Victoria fish cluster encompasses industrial fish processors and their supply beaches. Most of the
industrial processors are located in Kisumu, a town on the shores of the lake. All produce frozen and/or chilled
fish fillets mainly for the export market. The fish is supplied by traders operating in and through some 65
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fishing beaches on the Kenyan side of the lake (Ogutu 1988). For purposes of understanding their structure and
dynamics, one was selected for intensive investigation (McCormick et al. 1995, 1996; Mitullah 1996, 1997,
1998). Although that cluster – Uhanya Beach – may or may not be representative of the population,  much can
be learned by examining its activities through the lens of collective efficiency.
5.2.1   History and turning-points of the Lake Victoria fishing cluster
Lake Victoria has had a long history of artisanal fishing. The Luo people, who live around the lake, enjoyed fish
as a part of their normal diet. The lake had a variety of species and artisans caught, processed, and to a limited
degree, traded many of them. Activity in places like Uhanya Beach grew slowly through the 1970s, with most of
the impetus coming from increased trade  for a widening local market.
The early 1980s brought a major change in Lake Victoria fisheries. Three  factors converged to bring about
what has been called the Nile Perch boom (Mitullah 1998). The first factor was a virtually untapped supply of
large fish, the Nile Perch, which British scientists had introduced into Lake Victoria in 1954 (Geheb 1997: 68–
69).  The second factor was the demand for quality fish by consumers in industrialised countries, which
continued to grow as fish supplies in northern waters dwindled (Jansen 1996).  The third factor, which has
largely been overlooked in existing studies of this industry, was the presence in Kenya's Asian community of
both capital and entrepreneurial skills (Himbara 1994). The result was the establishment in Kenya of a major
fish-processing industry that by 1995 was exporting over 12,000 tonnes of Nile Perch valued at US$ 29 million,
most of it destined for markets in Europe, Japan, Israel, and North America (Kenya 1995b).15
Fish supplies began to fall in the early 1990s as a result of poor fisheries management. Four main factors
appear to explain the falling catch: overfishing, the practice of catching juvenile perch, trawling, and the spread
of the water hyacinth weed (Mitullah 1998). The first three factors are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. As
overfishing reduces the supply of large fish, some fishermen – especially those with traditional non-motorised
boats – begin to use smaller nets that bring smaller fish. As more and more small fish fail to mature, the
problem grows. Other fishermen with more resources have responded to the diminishing catch by trawling, a
practice which, if carried out during the breeding season, can destroy nursery grounds. The spread of the water
hyacinth has effectively closed many fishing beaches and reduced fishing opportunities for artisanal
fishermen.16
Despite shrinking supplies, the industry at all levels continued to be profitable until, in early 1997, two
people in Spain died of salmonella poisoning after eating Nile Perch imported from Uganda. Spain immediately
imposed a ban on imports of East African Nile Perch. Other European countries followed suit, and then the
European Union (EU) acted on behalf of all its members to ban Nile Perch imports. The effect on Kenya's fish
industry was immediate and devastating. Factories that had been supplying the European market had to cut
production drastically pending a visit by EU inspectors. Prices at the beaches dropped from K.shs 50 per kilo to
25 per kilo almost overnight. When the inspectors came to Kenya, they found that the handling of fish was
unsatisfactory both at the beaches and in the factories. At Uhanya Beach, the main problem was the way fish
was moved from the boats to the factories' refrigerated trucks. Fish was often dragged along the ground and
then thrown on the dirty cement floor of the cooperative's weighing shed or banda. From there, agents of the
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large-scale processors selected the best of the catch and placed them on ice in insulated trucks to be transported
to the factories. Some factories were also cited for poor sanitation, and the inspectors outlined new procedures
that had to be followed by processors exporting to the EU.
The response to the shock was mixed. Some processors used to operating in less fussy markets made few
changes as a result of the EU inspection visit. Those processors who depended on the European market
cooperated both with the inspectors and the Kenyan health authorities to improve conditions within their
factories. Several made major investments to ensure that they could comply with EU standards, and at least one
sought and obtained ISO 9000 certification. The change in Uhanya Beach was dramatic. A visit to the beach in
June 1997 revealed a new banda located only a few metres from the water's edge. Fish were being transported
suspended from poles to ensure that they did not touch the ground. Upon reaching the banda, they were washed
in chlorinated water and placed on a clean surface for selection. The fish selected by the factory agent received a
second dipping into salted, chlorinated water before being placed in the truck. The whole process, including the
investment in banda and water treatment facilities, was the result of a collaboration between Uhanya's largest
trader and one of the large-scale fish processors.
5.2.2   Economic context for fishing and fish processing
Most Kenyan Nile perch is destined for the lucrative export market. Europe, as already indicated, is the most
discriminating market. Its quality standards are very high, and because Europe is now essentially one market,  a
problem perceived in one country quickly spreads to all of the others. Kenyan fish is also exported to Japan,
Israel, and North America. Most of the processors claimed not to know the final destination of their fish. Their
customers are importers who resell the fish to others. Only one company mentioned specific uses, such as fast
food chains in Japan and supermarkets in North America.
The export market is large. No fish processor reported lack of demand. On the contrary, most could sell
much more, if they had larger supplies of raw fish. The domestic market is both smaller and more diverse. Fresh
and frozen Nile Perch are sold to hotels, institutions and retailers, mainly in Nairobi and the larger towns.
Artisanally processed fish, which is very popular in the western part of Kenya, finds its way to markets
throughout the country. Finally, there are markets for various fish by-products. The so-called 'fish frames', the
skeletons remaining after factories complete the filleting process, are demanded both by those processing for
low-income consumers and as an input into the fish meal animal feed manufactured by several large factories in
Kenya. The fish bladders are a food delicacy in China, and an ingredient in isinglass, a substance used, among
other things, for making glue and clarifying wine.
It is difficult to assess the availability of economies of scale. Most fish processors were operating under
capacity, many at only one-third or one-half of potential output. This suggests that economies of scale should be
realisable, although the fact that the larger factories tended to operate more than one production line indicates
that physical scale economies may be quickly reached. Export processing may, however, give rise to certain
managerial economies resulting from the need for marketing, financial, and bureaucratic expertise.17
No obvious economies of scope emerged from our interviews of the large-scale processors. On the other
hand, most processors seemed uninterested in the possibility of diversifying into products that might offer such
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economies. Only one large firm indicated that it was considering processing other types of fish, or developing
new Nile Perch products.
The institutions governing exchange relations generally benefit the large-scale processors and their agents
at the expense of the fishermen. Transactions between traders and/or agents and the individual fishermen are
normally in cash. There are, however, some exceptions. Mitullah (1998) reports that Uhanya's largest trader has
formal arrangements with three factories that guarantee him future payment should he supply fish worth more
than the cash the driver is carrying.
According to one factory owner, most processors enter into a verbal or written agreement with their agents
that specify a fixed price, but allow for certain variations. One informant described the power of the truck
drivers who often double as agents:
Imagine a driver who has six tonnes of fish in a seven-tonne truck. When a fisherman comes late, the
driver says that he can only buy at 20 shillings per kilo. The driver has been authorised to pay 35 shillings
per kilo, so the difference is his.
Agents do not always honour their agreements. One beach ran into serious difficulties when an agent defaulted
on his contract with a factory and absconded with his cash advance.
5.2.3   External economies in the Lake Victoria fishing cluster
Market access is an important consideration for fishermen and traders operating within Uhanya beach.
Fishermen who land their fish at Uhanya have ready access to the daily line of trucks taking fish to the factories
and, if some or all of their catch on a particular day is not up to factory standards, there are plenty of traders and
local processors who will buy the 'rejects'. This no doubt explains why 86.7% of the fishermen interviewed said
that, if they were forced to relocate they would move to a similar cluster.
Small-scale traders also find Uhanya a convenient location. The road is better than the roads to many
beaches, and the area is served by matatus (public mini-buses) and buses that enable small-scale traders to move
quickly to other locations. Most small traders (65.8%) felt that they would not obtain the same results in a
different location. Most of these pointed to market factors as the reason why they prefer Uhanya: Uhanya is an
active beach and their customers are there.  The largest traders, on the other hand, were less wedded to Uhanya.
Although they recognised that Uhanya has 'easy transport and a good landing bay', they felt that they could be as
successful elsewhere as long as there was a good transport system.
Labour-market pooling does not seem to be a major source of external economies in the cluster.  Both
fishing and fish processing can, according to the respondents, be learned in less than two months by even the
slowest learner. Workers in factories seem to require only minimal skills.
Although some inputs are available within Uhanya, fishermen and artisanal processors have to travel as far
as Kisumu, some 65 km. distant, for others. The major inputs into factory production are electricity, water,
chemicals for water treatment and fish sterilisation, fish and packaging materials. Both electricity and water are
problematic throughout Kenya, forcing business owners to invest in backup facilities, but other inputs seem to
be easily available.
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Technological upgrading has taken place in a number of factories and  at selected beaches as a result of the
EU's inspection visit. The upgrading of the factories seemed to happen on a factory-by-factory basis, depending
on whether the particular producer intended to export to the EU. The relative isolation of the factories from
each other works against any real spillovers. Beach upgrading, similar to what happened at Uhanya Beach, has
taken place at least one other beach. Within Uhanya Beach, however, we saw no evidence that the improved fish
handling techniques developed for the new banda had been adopted by others in the cluster.
5.2.4   Joint action among fishermen, traders and fish processors
Joint action in this cluster needs to be considered in three parts: first, for actors in Uhanya Beach; second, for
the industrial processors; and finally, for the two together.
In Uhanya, little effective horizontal joint action exists at any level. Although at first sight, horizontal
cooperation appears to be strong, with 90 per cent of the fishermen belonging to the Yimbo Fishermen's
Cooperative Society (YFCS), nearly all members reported that the Cooperative  had no role in the two
potentially most important forms of cooperation: price setting and quality control (Mitullah 1998: 44).
Furthermore, despite awareness that access to cold storage would give fishermen an advantage in bargaining
with processors over fish prices, no action has been taken.  Apart from a few ice boxes on individual fishing
vessels, cold storage facilities are entirely lacking. Strategically, this is a serious collective failure, because it
means that fishermen will continue to be price-takers at the mercy of traders and processors.  Fishermen, aware
that the cooperative was not benefiting them, registered a parallel association in 1993, but when YFCS officials
used their political power to force fishermen to pay commissions to the cooperative, the new association fell
dormant. Most fishermen (93.3%) are also members of the Uhanya Beach Organisation. This association,
however, primarily addressed welfare rather than business concerns. More than half (56.7%) of the fishermen
subcontracted out some service activities such as net repair, boat repair, and transport (Mitullah 1998: 41). This
probably increased efficiency marginally, but did not seem to be a major feature of their operations.
Perhaps even more surprising than the lack of joint action in Uhanya is the almost total absence of
cooperation among the industrial processors. Their small numbers, geographic proximity, and for the majority,
ethnic affinity, would seem the ideal backdrop for co-operation. Yet they have no sectoral organisation, and our
interviews revealed a great deal of mistrust among them. None of them believed that an association or other
form of cooperation would be beneficial. One even said that he often saw one of his competitors near his plant
with binoculars! Despite this general lack of cooperation, business owners did respond when called by
government health officials to meetings prior to the EU inspection.
Unlike most of the clusters considered thus far, the most significant joint action in Lake Victoria's fish
cluster has been vertical. Trading linkages have spawned vertical bilateral joint action. Mitullah (1998) describes
a very strong vertical linkage between Uhanya Beach and the industrial processors that has resulted in the beach
upgrading. A large trader, responsible for more than half of the fish trade in Uhanya, has formal arrangements
with three industrial fish processors. This is unusual and, apparently, each factory considers this person to be
'its' agent at Uhanya. It was this trader, working with one of his partners, who was responsible for the upgrading
that enabled Uhanya to continue supplying fish to the European market.
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Many of the large-scale processors also have strong vertical linkages to particular importers in Europe, but
these linkages apparently did not result in assistance or investments to enable the factories to meet EU
standards. Rather, each factory that chose to upgrade its facilities did so on its own with internal or borrowed
capital.
5.2.5   Lake Victoria fishing: summary and conclusions
Effective vertical bilateral joint action has, for the moment at least, worked in the Lake Victoria fishing cluster.
Uhanya Beach has been upgraded to the point where it can continue to provide fish acceptable to large-scale
processors exporting to the European market. Undoubtedly large profits are accruing to the partners in this
action: Uhanya's largest trader and the factory he worked with. This trader's other partners seem to be
unknowing free riders, also profiting from the investment. It is also true that the action, by restoring fish prices
to their pre-shock levels, has preserved incomes for over 500 tiny enterprises within Uhanya Beach.
The cluster has been less successful in dealing with the continuing problem of dwindling fish supplies.
Many of the industrial processors seem to be trying to make up for the shortfall by getting fish from other parts
of the lake. No one really seems interested in addressing the root of the problem which is, according to
environmentalists and other key informants, overfishing and, especially, the practice of taking undersized fish.
Only one factory considered getting Nile Perch from sources outside of Lake Victoria. Such a move would, if
feasible, benefit the firm in question but the increased supply would probably mean lower prices for the lake's
fishermen. Similarly, only one large-scale firm expressed any interest in diversifying its products to include either
other types of fish or higher-level processing. It would seem that either strategy would remove some of the
pressure for continually increasing Nile Perch supplies from the Lake fisheries, while at the same time allowing
large-scale factories to maintain or increase profits. Here again, such strategies would mainly benefit the
factories and would run the risk of reducing the prices paid to fishermen.
Fishermen and small-scale traders and processors are especially vulnerable because they have no effective
mechanism for collective action. It would appear that the development of the cluster has been accompanied by
growing income inequality. Large-scale processors and traders have prospered while artisanal fishermen and
processors, and small-scale traders have benefited only marginally (Mitullah 1998: 33). Existing cooperatives
have been ineffective in dealing with critical upgrading issues. New mechanisms for horizontal joint action are
evidently needed. Fishermen need the freedom to form associations that they believe will work for their
interests, and to drop out of those that provide no benefits. Traders have this freedom and most have chosen
not to belong to any existing business association. Perhaps an investigation into the reasons for this would shed
further light on the rather complicated issue of horizontal linkages among small firms.
6   CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with a question: Is the metalwork cluster in Kamukunji, Nairobi, part of Africa's
industrialisation process? Analysis of the internal workings and external environment of clusters in Africa
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suggests that the answer must be 'yes', but that this is not the end of the story. Enterprise clusters in Africa are
at very different levels of development, and their ability to contribute to industrialisation varies accordingly.
Clusters can and do further the industrialisation process, but they do so in different ways. Those in the first
group make their contribution mainly by building a productive environment that, in some respects at least,
prepares the ground for the emergence of collective efficiency. Clustering clearly facilitates market access and
allows some firms to produce their goods in quantity. Some may then make the transition to factory production,
while others combine craft methods with increasing mechanisation. The fact that the firms are clustered also
encourages associational activity to begin. It is no coincidence that associations in such clusters usually focus on
efforts to improve working conditions within the cluster or gain access to needed supplies. Infrastructure,
especially water, electricity, and access roads are the most basic needs of industrial production. Without them,
these clusters are unlikely to move ahead.
The second group of clusters  has much clearer signs of emerging collective efficiency. These clusters are
already industrialising, but remain limited by the weak technology of most of the firms and the frequent
sidetracking of associational activity. Firm sizes in these clusters are similar to the first group, but the greater
specialisation and differentiation of firms leads to bilateral production linkages and, ultimately, to higher
efficiency. Higher-level technologies in at least some of the firms sets the stage for positive technological
spillovers. In cases where basic infrastructural and input needs have been met, associations can begin to deal
with issues of markets and technology.
The Western Cape clothing cluster and the Lake Victoria fish cluster include large- as well as small- and
medium-size firms. They aim for wider markets, both national and foreign, and are generally able to produce
competitively. Here, however, the resemblance between them ends. The Western Cape cluster is situated
squarely within the industrialisation process. Market access, labour-market pooling, intermediate input effects,
and technological spillovers are all present and positive. The cluster is characterised by extensive and varied
linkages – bilateral and multilateral, vertical and horizontal – that result in joint action in production and on key
issues affecting the cluster. The greatest need in this cluster and others like it is for continuing market analysis,
focused particularly on the export market, and for upgrading the small-firm segment of the cluster to encourage
more equal sharing of benefits. The existing associations can probably handle the first task, but the small firms
may need the assistance of government or NGOs in their efforts to strengthen their position.
The Lake Victoria cluster, on the other hand, is fragile. It has weathered an important storm in the EU
quality shock, but its weak mechanisms for joint action raise questions about its ability to step up output and
quality. The unequal power relations between the fishermen on the one hand, and the large traders and
processors on the other, mean that even when the cluster prospers, benefits are not well shared. Furthermore,
the challenge of dwindling fish supplies has not been adequately dealt with. All of these problems suggest that
those concerned need to work together. This will probably require new forms of public–private partnership.
The analysis raises other issues that cut across the three groupings of clusters. The first of these has to do
with the interplay of market access and firm growth. Across the clusters analysed there is evidence that
clustering reduces the growth constraints frequently identified in the literature on small enterprise. The most
notable example is access to markets. All clusters have been able to attract customers, from traders to final
consumers, as a result of the concentration of producers. The problem is that the size of the markets they are
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connected to in most cases remains small. This may partly explain why specialisation and skill development
have failed to develop very far in most of the small-enterprise clusters as well as why the middle-sized firms,
generally found in clusters elsewhere, are missing.
Another issue that cuts across the cluster groupings concerns the relationship of institutions to cluster
development. Institutional issues take at least two different forms. The first is the failure in many instances of
institutionalised cooperation, especially associational activity, to improve cluster operations.  One would expect
that associations and cooperatives, as vehicles for bringing together persons with similar interests, would be
strong forces for positive joint action. Yet our findings indicate that this is frequently not the case. Some, like
the Uhanya cooperative, are viewed as milking the membership. Others seem to get sidetracked or bogged
down in a single difficult problem. The reasons advanced to explain particular cases often do not apply more
generally. For example, both the Ziwani Jua Kali Association and the Suame Garages Association were creations
of government rather than of the membership. Yet one appears to be at least attempting to address the cluster's
strategic needs, while the other is languishing as a government 'errand boy'. Research focused on these
institutions and their multiple linkages and interests is probably needed to assess their potential role as engines
of cluster development. The second institutional issue concerns the effect of weak institutions on exchange
relations and, ultimately, on the cluster's performance and growth. In several clusters, for example, we observed
that producers' lack of ability to enforce commercial contracts narrows the market and/or limits operations to
cash transactions. Such a situation constrains business activity and makes a firm vulnerable to theft, sometimes
on a large scale. Much more research, especially comparative research, on the development of economic
institutions needs to be undertaken. Such research should consider social and political, as well as economic
factors affecting the genesis and growth of institutions.
Repair activities figure prominently in several clusters; some engage in both repairs and manufacturing.
The relationship of repairs to manufacturing is an important one, not only because it offers some firms the
opportunity to realise economies of scope, but also because industrial history in many countries and sectors
shows manufacturing growing out of repairing. This is beginning to happen in some of the clusters studied.
Whether significant small-scale manufacturing can develop from these activities will depend, among other
things, on the size of the market these manufacturers can access and their ability to compete, in terms of quality
and price, with newly available imports.
Many of the small-enterprise clusters derive in one way or another from the implementation of government
spatial policies barring certain activities from residential areas and central business districts. The relocation of
businesses has created new clusters. Kamukunji, Thika, Ziwani, and Suame are all the result of such 'forced
agglomeration'. It is interesting to note, however, that many of the enterprises that were forced into these
clusters were already clustered elsewhere. The new cluster then consisted of one or more groups of enterprises
from other locations that were later joined by others, who moved in individually or started their businesses in
the new cluster. In such circumstances, forming a group identity can be a slow and painful process, as producers
may tend to hold on to old allegiances. In the Thika cluster, for example, the Mariko Jua Kali Association is a
carryover from the former market site. Although it is a welfare, rather than a business association, many of its
members apparently felt that one association was enough and did not bother to join the site association until
very recently. This may partly explain the lack of effective joint action in the Thika cluster.
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The analysis suggests that there is plenty of scope for positive intervention at both policy and programme
levels in enterprise clusters. If, as appears to be the case, clusters further the industrialisation process, then
countries with industrialisation on their development agenda would do well to enact policies favourable to
cluster formation. Such policies might include incentives for producing firms of varying sizes to locate within
clusters, priority to clusters in infrastructure decisions, and encouragement of associational activity. At the level
of programmes, both government and non-governmental organisations can assist the development of collective
efficiency: providing business ideas and training to encourage the emergence of specialist producers, traders and
service enterprises, or strengthening cooperation between enterprises.  The measures to be considered include:
subsidising visits to trade fairs or joint stands at such fairs, support for standardisation, support for arbitration
services, or fostering cooperation between enterprises through external assistance.
This paper has attempted to draw together information from a relatively small group of studies. Most of
these have their origins in small-enterprise research, and all come from a few countries in English-speaking
Africa. Inclusion of other clusters in other countries might modify these results. Studies that compare clustered
with isolated firms in the same industry might shed new light on the effects of clustering.  Further exploration
of aspects not well covered in the studies reviewed here, such as the institutional framework, and social and
political variables, will also help to deepen our understanding of the functioning of clusters. These
considerations notwithstanding, it appears that enterprise clusters can be one way towards industrialisation for
African countries. Supporting enterprise clusters may not result in industrialisation tomorrow. But informed
support, which recognises that clusters have different needs at different stages of development, will probably
help it to happen sooner rather than later. This is an important finding for associations, governments, donors,
and those businesses that make clusters their home.
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NOTES
1.  This paper is one of the outputs of the Kenya portion of a larger project on Collective Efficiency and Small-
scale Industry, directed by Hubert Schmitz of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex,
and funded by the Department for International Development, London. We are grateful to many people for
their input and assistance, but most especially to Hubert Schmitz, whose patient leadership and insightful
comments have helped to shape our work in Kenya. I also appreciate those who provided valuable comments
on various versions of this paper: Raphie Kaplinsky, Patrick Alila, Poul Ove Pedersen, John Humphrey,
Hermine Weijland, Catherine Masinde, Brian O'Riordan, Khalid Nadvi, Winnie Mitullah and Mary Kinyanjui.
Finally, my thanks go to the staff of the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, for the
logistical support that has made the work run smoothly.
2.  Jua kali, the Swahili words for 'hot sun', was originally used to refer to artisanal manufacturing and repair
businesses that operate without shelter, but has gradually broadened to cover many types of small enterprises.
3.  This notion of cluster, while it shares its geographic dimension with the growth centres described in the
regional planning literature, is different in at least two important respects. The cluster is a work place, consisting
of various types of business enterprises. Even if people reside within its boundaries, the analytical unit remains
an enterprise grouping. The growth centre, on the other hand, is an urban space that includes residential units,
schools, places of worship, health facilities, etc. as well as businesses. The second difference is the sectoral
concentration of the enterprise cluster, which need not be present in the growth centre.
4.  The literature on networks and linkages in business is large and growing. Useful summaries are contained in
Mead (1994) and McCormick and Atieno (1997).
5.  The terms cooperation and joint action are used interchangeably in this paper to mean 'working together
for the same end', i.e. the active aspect of collective efficiency. Linkages, on the other hand, are ties between or
among firms that may or may not result in joint action.
6.  Information in this paragraph was collected by the author in November 1997 with assistance from Betty
Munyendo.
7.  Based on an interview with the secretary of the Kamukunji Jua Kali Association, November 1997.
8.  Field notes of personal interview with founder of Kamukunji Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19
June 1986.
9.  Field notes of personal interview with founder of Kamukunji Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19
June 1986. See also King (1996).
10.  This section is based on an interview in November 1997 with an artisan who was among the first to make
wheelbarrows in Kamukunji in 1984.
11.  From field notes of interview with Kamukunji Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19 June 1986.
12.  Matatus are small public transport vehicles. In Thika and other up-country areas, most are 11–14 passenger
vans or converted pick-up trucks. On many Nairobi routes, larger mini-buses with up to 30 seats are used.
13.  These averages were calculated from grouped data in Dawson (1988: 15).
14.  Cushion-makers are one of the eleven repair specialisations, but their data are included with manufacturing.
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15.  Values stated in Kenya shillings have been converted to US dollars at a rate of K.shs.51.4 to one dollar.
This is the mean of monthly rates for 1995 as reported in The Monthly Economic Review for September
1996 (Central Bank of Kenya 1996).
16.  By providing breeding space for other species of fish that are part of the perch's diet, limited amounts of
water hyacinth could actually lead to an increase in Nile Perch in the lake. Nevertheless, the present
uncontrolled spread of the weed threatens fishermen's livelihoods.
17. See Penrose (1959: 92ff) for a discussion of managerial economies of size and growth.
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